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The United States’ strategy to combat the terrorism threat has been widely 
debated since the attacks on 9/11. These attacks spurred many opinions on the 
best method to counter terrorism, whether through the military, law enforcement, 
intelligence, or diplomacy. The United States Intelligence Community has highly 
motivated agencies with specialized tools and techniques which have been 
effectively used to thwart terrorist plots and engage in offensive actions. 
Unfortunately, there is no singular answer to terrorism. It requires the assimilation 
and strategic usage of these disciplines to be successful.   
The United States government must advance beyond mere coordination 
as it is not the optimal standard. Collaboration is the defining difference to 
achieve the best strategic advantage. An analysis of the best practices identified 
in business and government to form cohesion within a unit will be conducted and 
compared to the current structures within the Intelligence Community. The 
strengths and limitations of existing units are carefully analyzed, and a model is 
proposed and examined using the same methodology. This research suggests 
that through a highly collaborative unit engaging all the relevant disciplines the 
United States can move toward a more effective strategy to counter the terrorist 
threat. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The United States’ strategy to combat terrorism has been a popular topic 
of debate since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. A wide variety of 
experts, researchers, politicians, reporters, and pundits have offered their 
opinions on the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) and its ability to 
counter the threat. James Simon Jr. compared the USIC to Frankenstein with the 
following description, “an impressive achievement in its parts, but flawed as a 
whole” (2005, p. 149). The underlying question is whether or not “Frankenstein” 
can be repaired or should it be dismantled and rebuilt. Two of the main 
discussion topics have included the failure of the intelligence community to 
prevent the attacks on 9/11 and the reorganization of the intelligence community. 
Regardless of these discussions and the subsequent changes, the United States 
still lacks an entity that preserves all end-game options by using the collaborative 
capacity of agencies within the United States Intelligence Community.   
Nearly all agencies participate in sending and receiving joint duty 
assignees and in promoting information sharing, yet there continues to be calls 
for enhanced cooperation. For example, one proposal is a National Interagency 
Task Force (NIATF), comprised of experts from the various disciplines, to 
operationally deploy overseas in trouble zones. Between deployments, the 
NIATF could assist the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in other 
counterterrorism missions. The NIATF could also assist in non-terrorism 
missions. The importance of operating together is to build joint experiences 
which would enhance the group’s cohesiveness and success in future missions 
as the partners learn the strengths and weaknesses of each organization (Martin, 
2006, p. 9).   
The United States military is using a model called the joint interagency 
coordination group (JIACG) to enhance its ability to coordinate actions internal 
 2 
and external to the military. The JIACG staff ensures positive information flow up 
to the commander for situational awareness and also out to other organizations 
(Jones, 2007, p. 3). Another example is the State Department’s deployment of 
foreign emergency support teams during times of overseas crises. These teams 
include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), State Department, Department of Defense (DoD), and other agencies 
(Miller, Stone, & Mitchell, 2002, p. 229). The current strategy has delivered many 
successes since 9/11, but strategies should never be static.   
This research investigates options to more effectively combat the terrorism 
threat around the world. In 2007, the United States Intelligence Community 
initiated the “500 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration.”  This plan was to 
address multiple organizational challenges. Collaboration and the factors that 
hinder true collaboration, such as agency goals being considered more important 
performance measures than community goals, were addressed (Office of 
Director of National Intelligence, 2008). The United States has organizations, 
such as the National Counterterrorism Center, to enhance information sharing 
and coordination, but this research argues that this is not adequate for targeting 
specific terrorists. The mechanisms in place were designed for strategic 
cooperation and action. This thesis explores the need for enhanced collaboration 
to tactically target individuals.  
The author recognizes the significant contributions made by the military in 
combating terrorism. Because of the nature of the threat, the United States must 
approach the war on terror cohesively using both military actions and intelligence 
operations (Torres, 2007, p. 1). This thesis purposefully excludes the portion of 
the DoD responsible for offensive engagements as this is beyond the scope of 
this research. However, the DoD’s contribution in the intelligence realm, and to 
some extent its kinetic capabilities, serves an important role in countering 
terrorism. The successful nighttime raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound that 
resulted in his death is a prime example of the importance of the DoD’s 
capabilities. Except for the target, this raid was not unusual. President Obama’s 
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administration has dramatically increased the use of special operations forces in 
covert raids. For example, in 2011, approximately 2,200 raids were conducted, 
and the Pentagon has estimated 90 percent of these raids “end without a shot 
fired” (Masters, 2013).   
The dominant strategy followed by the United States has been offensive 
engagement through the military and the CIA. The DoD has deployed soldiers 
from all branches of the military to many different countries. During this war the 
military has killed or captured thousands of enemy combatants. The CIA has also 
captured or taken custody of terrorists throughout the world. Of those captured, 
many were transported to Guantánamo Bay or other detention facilities around 
the world. Even though many of these terrorists were specifically targeted by the 
CIA and DoD, there was little forethought to their ultimate outcome as the 
capture was the end state rather than the means to an end. Permanent 
neutralization of the threat through prosecution, targeted killing, or rehabilitation 
to non-violent means of expression is the goal.   
The Guantanamo Bay Naval Base has detained 779 individuals since its 
inception. Approximately 530 detainees were released or transferred to the 
custody of another country prior to 2009 (Department of Justice, 2010). The 
Guantanamo Review Task Force, created by Executive Order 13492 in January 
2009, reviewed the cases of 240 detainees still being held in the Guantanamo 
facility. Of the remaining detainees, 36 were referred for prosecution. Forty-eight 
were approved for further detention as they still posed a risk to national security, 
yet the evidence was not sufficient for a prosecution (Department of Justice, 
2010). The small number of detainees referred for prosecution highlights the 
difficulty of obtaining and developing usable evidence for a prosecution. 
Releasing the detainees creates future risks as approximately 28 percent of 
released detainees were either confirmed or suspected of reengagement as with 
the enemy (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012). Yet, the 
detention of terrorists in Guantanamo Bay has become fodder for recruitment of 
terrorists (Brahimi, 2013; Carroll, 2013). President Obama described 
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Guantanamo Bay as “a recruitment tool for extremists,” and further stated “it 
hurts us in terms of our international standing” (Obama, 2013).   
The United States government has struggled politically and legally with the 
fate of captured enemy combatants. President Barack Obama ordered the 
closure of the Guantánamo Bay detention facility in January 2009 (White House, 
2009). Additionally, he ordered all CIA prisons to be closed throughout the world 
(Shane, 2009). While closing CIA prisons was a fairly simple order, closing 
Guantanamo Bay has been anything but simple. After ascending into office, 
President Obama was confronted with legislation from a Democratic—led 
Congress that effectively prevented many of his options to close Guantanamo 
Bay (Northam, 2013). For example, one option is to prosecute the detainees in a 
military tribunal, a federal judicial court, or a specially developed terrorism court 
modeled after the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court.   
Each option has its own limitations. The military commissions differ from 
federal prosecutions in several ways. One specific way is the defense right to 
counsel. Under the proposed rules for the commissions, all defense counsel 
must be U.S. citizens. Federal procedure allows a defendant to seek counsel 
from their own nation. This rule allows the government to also approve or not to 
approve the defendant’s counsel (Glazier, 2003, p. 2019).   
Other alternatives include releasing the detainees into the custody of their 
countries of birth or continuing their detention in military holding facilities within 
the United States. Because terrorist groups continue to conduct operations and 
training throughout the world, simply releasing detainees is dangerous. As of 
December 29, 2011, 599 detainees had been transferred out of the Guantanamo 
Bay facility (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012). Of those, 15.9 
percent were confirmed to have reengaged in terrorism activity, and another 12 
percent were suspected of reengagement (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2012). Whenever possible, the end-game strategy must be 
considered prior to action in order to limit scenarios in which a person is captured 
without a proposed end. 
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The current strategy has forced the United States into a defensive position 
regarding detainees. Congress and the presidential administration continue to 
explore solutions to those individuals currently detained in Guantanamo Bay. 
While some may ultimately be released, there are many of them who are 
deemed to be too dangerous for release. Yet, the United States has little to no 
evidence that could be presented in an Article III court for trial because these 
individuals were captured and detained outside the scope of a law enforcement 
action. Only in the future will the efficacy of military tribunals be able to be 
judged. At this time, because of the many factors yet to be decided, it is unknown 
whether they will be judged as competent and fair with due process given to the 
prisoners or will they be considered “kangaroo courts” (Glazier, 2003, p. 2011). 
By using a broad definition of terrorism and the terrorist threat, the United States 
aggressively pursued a strategy that fueled anti-American feelings from the 
world. It is possible this may have resulted in more terrorist threats than it 
stopped (Davis, 2006, p. 139).   
In the face of international criticism and the current difficulties of 
processing detainees, the national counterterrorism strategy is being revised. 
The differing views around the world about America continue to fuel debate about 
the methods used by the United States to combat terrorism (Stivachtis, 2006, p. 
153). The United States finds itself at a crossroads as there is no absolute or 
singular strategy which will be successful against every terrorist group or 
operator. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, even within the United States. 
President Theodore Roosevelt called for a “crusade to exterminate terrorism 
everywhere” after President William McKinley was assassinated by anarchists 
(Rapoport, 2004, pp. 46–47). The United States became a focal point for the 
eradication of terrorists in retribution for the attacks on 9/11, and it will take the 
strengths of multiple agencies to combat the problem.   
The United States has pursued and will continue to pursue specific and 
identified terrorists. The participating members of the USIC have primary areas of 
expertise, such as law enforcement, military or intelligence. The agencies may be 
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conversant in other disciplines, but their knowledge and experience is typically 
limited. This thesis argues that national security would be enhanced through a 
true collaboration of these areas of expertise.   
Because “internal barriers to organizational change are powerful and 
deeply entrenched” (Zegart, 2007, p. 45), change should be carefully considered. 
If change is required, it must be accepted by those whom it impacts. President 
Woodrow Wilson once stated, “If you want to make enemies, try to change 
something” (Wilson, 2013). People are resistant to change. In general, people 
see themselves as good performers. In addition, they rate their work higher than 
what others would rate them (Kelman, 2005, p. 24). This gap makes change 
more difficult because people do not perceive as much need for change because 
they believe they are performing well (Kelman, 2005, p. 24). Whether or not 
change is necessary is not decided solely by successes and failures, but also by 
looking for gaps in the national security structure.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• Do the current agencies and task forces within the United States 
Intelligence Community have the collaborative capacity to 
neutralize specifically identified terrorists through any available 
method? 
• How should a unit be structured to effectively combine the 
capabilities of the military, the intelligence community, and law 
enforcement, in order to preserve all end-game options?   
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many writers have articulated the value of attacking terrorism through all 
available means because agencies with a singular focus will be limited by their 
own capabilities. The FBI had a history of focusing on criminal leads versus 
intelligence leads. Arrests and prosecution statistics were the criteria to judge an 
individual agent and an office. Unfortunately, this often led to ignoring or 
conducting insufficient analysis of intelligence (Miller, Stone, & Mitchell, 2002, p. 
329). Successful military campaigns will be unable to stop all terrorism because 
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terrorist groups would rather fight on the battlefield than in a court of law (Davis, 
2006, pp. 140–141).    
When a military inserts ground troops to fight terrorism, there can be 
negative consequences. Specifically, the terrorists do not have to travel to fight 
the enemy, and their recruitment propaganda is validated as they cast the 
military as an invading force (Benjamin, 2008, p. 9). The military can be an 
effective response to terrorism, but the analysis by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki 
concluded only seven percent of terrorists group ended because of military action 
(2008, p. 19). 
The two main models to combat terrorism are the law enforcement model 
and the war model. The war model concentrates on significant offensive and 
aggressive actions while the law enforcement model requires minimal use of 
force and seeks to use criminal laws to combat terrorism. Neither of these 
models if used to the exclusion of the other will eliminate terrorism. The answer 
can more appropriately be found in an infusion of both principles (Clutterbuck, 
2004, pp. 142–143). Jones and Libicki identified “policing, military force, 
splintering, politics, [and] victory” as the major catalyst for how terrorist groups 
end, and the end is usually the result of more than one factor (2008, p. 10). 
Lindsay Clutterbuck (2004) opines that because strong democracies have 
legitimate and tested laws, the criminal justice system should be the focus. 
However, targeting terrorism as a criminal violation does not preclude use of the 
military for counter terrorism operations. Military force should not be an 
alternative to law enforcement. Instead, it should be part of an integrated plan to 
counter terrorism (Clutterbuck, 2004, pp. 140–150). This multi-pronged approach 
has immediate merit because it provides options to decision makers. Before the 
attacks of 9/11, most countries viewed terrorism as a law-enforcement problem, 
yet the American reaction was a military response. The separation between 
these organizations may be “inappropriate to combat security threats” (Davis, 
2006, pp. 139–140).   
 8 
The opinions on which method is the most productive are varied. The 9/11 
Commission opined the successes in the 1990s from the first World Trade 
Center bombing and other plots that were successfully thwarted through law 
enforcement means gave the United States the false belief the threat could be 
handled through law enforcement. Also, the successful prosecution negated any 
reasons to look at terrorism through any other lens (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 72). Because of the 
international limitations of police agencies, the law enforcement approach cannot 
be the sole approach. The lack of cohesiveness and international law is exploited 
by terrorists (Maogoto, 2005, pp. 52–53). If all measures are considered as 
potential courses of action, then the strengths and limitations of each must be 
reviewed.     
1. Law Enforcement Model 
The observations and opinions typically concentrate on only one 
discipline—diplomacy, intelligence, military, or law enforcement—to the exclusion 
of the other disciplines and how they interact. The law plays an important part in 
the life of a Muslim, and it is held with high honor. Religious scholars often 
consider themselves jurists who also have a specialty in theology (Akhavi, 2008, 
p. 37). Within Islam, sharia is the foundation for a Muslim’s life. The sharia, as 
Islamic law, comes from the Quran and the Sunna (Johnson & Vriens, 2013). 
Imams are more than just religious leaders. They have a responsibility to assist 
in the governance and social affairs of the Muslim community (Responsibilities of 
an Imam, n.d.). A predominant topic has been the influence of the law. The legal 
framework of terrorism and counterterrorism, especially in terms of detainees and 
interrogations, encompasses a significant amount of research and opinions.   
The Honorable John C. Coughenour, Federal Judge, Western District of 
Washington, testified before a Senate hearing that Article III courts were more 
“than just another tool,” but they stood as an anchor for American values. Judge 
Coughenour spoke with the experience of presiding over the case against the 
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Millennium Bomber, Ahmed Ressam (Committee on the Judiciary: United States 
Senate, 2008, pp. 4–5). In the same hearing in which Judge Coughenour 
expressed his views on the adequacy of the Article III courts, another panelist, 
Professor Amos Guiora, former commander of the Israel Defense Force’s School 
of Military Law, opined that Article III courts would be incapable of handling the 
volume and complexity, specifically the use of classified information, of cases. He 
recommended the creation of an “American Domestic Terror Court” (Committee 
on the Judiciary: United States Senate, 2008, pp. 8–9). Both panelists believed 
the Guantanamo Bay detention facility should be closed. Even within President 
Bush’s administration, there was significant disagreement about the legal points 
of the war on terror (Golden & Schmitt, 2005).   
The United States criminal justice system has adapted since 9/11. 
Through the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) enhancements, additional authority, and investigative 
powers have been granted to the FBI. The Department of Justice has used anti-
terrorism statutes as well as traditional criminal statutes to prosecute known or 
suspected terrorists (Department of Justice, 2008). Historically, terrorism has 
been a crime. However, since President Bush termed it a “war,” violence by the 
combatants became legitimate violence under the rules of war (Aukerman, 2008, 
pp. 148–149). The violence of Al Qaeda could still be considered illegitimate 
because they target civilians, which is not acting within the rules of war 
(Aukerman, 2008, pp. 148–149). Within the United States, courts have the power 
of judicial review. But because of the many nuances, national security concerns 
are not straight forward and often make it difficult for courts to decide definitively 
across the spectrum of possible issues and combinations (Bay, 2008, p. 67). 
Furthermore, the law enforcement option can also be difficult because countries 
cannot agree upon a definition of terrorism.   
Ultimately, any legal action must begin with an enforceable law. The lack 
of a standard definition of terrorism, and the resulting complications, is a 
consistent theme in many writings. The lack of a definition limits the ability of 
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states to have an effective discourse over appropriate measures to counter 
terrorism. Some countries see acts of violence as a national liberation movement 
while others view that violence as terrorism. Natural political and cultural biases 
play into these differences (Maogoto, 2005, pp. 51, 60–61). The observer of 
terrorist acts makes a judgment based upon his biases. If similar powers are in a 
fight against each other, it is called a war or battle. When a weaker country or 
group is attacked and they use asymmetrical techniques, it is called terrorism 
(Hanafi, 2006, p. 10). Even with an agreed-upon definition, it still may leave for 
interpretation areas such as inter-ethnic or communal conflict (Davis, 2006, pp. 
112–113). The derivation of any definition of terrorism will be biased by political 
and societal understandings. However, the strength of a legal definition is the 
authority granted to the law. Even if the definition is not perfect, a working 
definition allows states to compare actions to the law (Barnidge, 2008, p. 16). 
Even without a standard definition of terrorism, there are other ways to utilize the 
law.   
The law enforcement approach would allow countries to charge terrorists 
as criminals in violation of state laws such as murder and kidnapping. These 
offenses infer upon the terrorists a criminal label, and they do not require any 
political or social justification for the motive. Since terrorism is ambiguous, a 
question arises whether terrorists should be viewed as acting within the rules of 
war or within the rules of criminal law. Unfortunately, legal means will not fully 
stop the threat of terrorism; therefore, states naturally look to other methods 
(Maogoto, 2005, pp. 51–52). The law enforcement approach is restricted if the 
laws enacted by countries throughout the world are not adequate and if countries 
are unwilling to enforce their laws.   
Afghanistan was a safe haven for Al Qaeda prior to 9/11, and this severely 
limited the United States’ options. While most countries viewed terrorism as a 
law-enforcement problem before the attacks of 9/11, the American doctrine was 
a military response as the attacks were considered a national security problem 
(Davis, 2006, p. 139). The United States created some confusion because during 
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the early part of the war on terror it indicated a desire to criminally prosecute Al 
Qaeda and Taliban leaders. Declaring war and claiming the enemy combatants 
would be tried as criminals caused a legal dilemma. The Geneva Convention 
requires prisoners of war to be tried similarly to military members of the detaining 
country (Roberts, 2004, p. 209).   
Adding further uncertainty, the Bush administration appeared arbitrary in 
its application of the rules of war. Some enemy combatants were classified as 
prisoners of war and some as criminal defendants. The administration was 
selective in its application of criminal law, and this appeared to be based upon 
the amount of evidence available for a prosecution (Aukerman, 2008, p. 145). 
This exacerbated the debate whether or not terrorism should be countered solely 
through law enforcement. If terrorism was only a crime, this would be the logical 
conclusion. However, the difference between crimes committed for criminal 
purposes and crimes for terrorism purposes has become blurred (Clutterbuck, 
2004, pp. 146–147). Specifically, fundraising and sending money overseas is a 
difficult area to investigate.   
Many organizations, such as Hamas, have created branches for different 
purposes. Many people distinguish between Hamas’ military, political, and social 
fronts. As a result, Hamas is able to overtly carry on its political and social work 
while covertly conducting its military operations (Levitt, 2006, p. 3). Determining 
whether or not a person has intentionally sent money to support terrorism is 
legally challenging. Another difficulty in the counterterrorism mission is identifying 
those persons planning an act of terrorism before they succeed. Because the 
perpetrators may be individuals who have never committed a crime prior to their 
current conspiracy, the law enforcement approach may be an unsuccessful 
means (Pillar, 2004, p. 115). As a result, the United States government should 
not limit itself to just law enforcement powers.   
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2. The Role of Intelligence 
The intelligence apparatus should be part of the counterterrorism strategy 
while recognizing it also has inherent limitations. The National Security Act of 
1947 was written to spread intelligence powers across multiple organizations. 
Specifically, the CIA was given no arrest powers. The framers of this act did not 
want the CIA to have power over both foreign and domestic intelligence activity 
(Bay, 2008, p. 73). Although the original intent of the creation of the CIA was to 
give significant power to the director, it was watered down by multiple other 
agencies fighting to protect their turf. For instance, the FBI wanted to maintain 
control of activities within the U.S. homeland, and the Department of Defense did 
not want to cede any control of its intelligence operations. There was also 
concern about the CIA spying on American citizens (Zegart, 2007, pp. 64–65). 
The various reforms since 9/11 have altered the intelligence community and the 
roles of each agency. The CIA has seen its role diminished (Lowenthal, 2006,  
p. 40). 
The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) recommended the 
FBI rely on other intelligence community partners to provide covert overseas 
intelligence collection, and other agencies should rely on the FBI for domestic 
collection. Without coordinating and assigning collection roles, the intelligence 
was creating redundancies (National Academy of Public Administration, 2005, p. 
xv). Yet, this proposal was not universal as there are differing opinions. Domestic 
intelligence may be better served by the CIA, which does not have arrest powers. 
There is a distinction between active intelligence collection for national goals and 
intelligence collection ancillary to a law enforcement investigation. Law 
enforcement is a traditional mission of the FBI (Sims, 2005c, p. 56). Hitz opined 
the CIA should be given broader powers to operate in the United States. This is a 
better alternative than to be limited by the judiciary branch because the courts 
will focus more on civil liberties than on counterterrorism (Hitz, 2008, p. 369).   
The National Security Act of 1947 kept the CIA apart from military control. 
It also restricted the CIA’s ability to operate domestically and prohibited any 
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police powers (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 20). President Truman did not want an 
American Gestapo; therefore, the CIA was not given law enforcement powers 
(Hitz, 2008, p. 367). During the search for Ramzi Yousef, the FBI and CIA began 
coordinating their investigations. The CIA realized the FBI had a unique tool 
because the FBI had arrest powers. However, the relationship was not strong as 
they continue to distrust each other. Each agency felt the other agency was 
withholding information (Miller, Stone, & Mitchell, 2002, p. 125).   
Since 9/11, the CIA has exercised its authority of extra-judicial rendition 
but not without controversy. On April 17, 2007, the House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Foreign Affairs held a public hearing to discuss renditions. Within 
the hearing, the elected members and invited participants discussed the 
consequences of renditions on foreign relations with other countries, the 
European Parliament report, which condemned the European countries complicit 
in the CIA activities, and UN Conventions and treaties (Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 2007). Even if the practice was accepted in the public’s eye, there would 
eventually need to be a day of judgment for the target. However, the National 
Security Act restricts the options available to the CIA once a terrorist is identified. 
Captured terrorists must be brought before a judicial proceeding at some point as 
there will come a time when they no longer have any intelligence value 
(Lowenthal, 2006, p. 266). The nature of their work generally precludes CIA 
officers from testifying in an open court. Thus, a law enforcement entity is 
needed.   
The argument between intelligence and law enforcement may have 
become an unnecessary distraction. Intelligence sharing and collaboration of law 
enforcement agencies is the most effective way to combat terrorism (Krishna-
Hensel, 2006, p. 7). Terrorist groups do not need to be approached in a uniform 
manner as their motives should be distinguished to determine the best 
countermeasure (Davis, 2006, p. 138). While these statements may be true, the 
USIC has historically struggled with full cooperation. In January 2001, the Hart 
Rudman commission concluded the United States was vulnerable to terrorist 
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attack because of its organizational problems (Zegart, 2007, p. 5). The 
convergence of overseas and domestic operations is drawing the CIA into the 
traditional jurisdiction of the FBI. Historically, the CIA has worked with law 
enforcement counterparts in the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) serving missions in 
criminal matters such as counter narcotics (Hitz, 2008, p. 368). A rendition, even 
as part of an intelligence operation, requires law enforcement (Lowenthal, 2006, 
p. 234). When the United States Congress passed the National Security Act of 
1947, it wanted all national security assets to work together toward common 
national objectives (Martin, 2006, p. 1).   
3. Diplomacy 
A third discipline that is needed is diplomacy. One theory for the rise of 
terrorism is the “unequal development” of peoples and countries throughout the 
world. The weaker countries or groups feel pressure to respond. Terrorism 
becomes a tool with which to attack the bigger countries (Krishna-Hensel, 2006, 
p. 7). The European Union security strategy, ratified in December 2003, stated, 
“Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free…period of peace 
and stability unprecedented in European history.”  The strategy identified 
terrorism as a threat and noted the method to confront this threat differed among 
countries (Davis, 2006, p. 111). Intelligence policy cannot stand alone. It is 
influenced not only by politics but also by laws and oversight. Yet, even within 
this context, there is often a necessity to violate the laws of another country for 
the security of the United States (Sims, 2005b, p. 17).   
Diplomacy must be part of the efforts to combat terrorism because 
international terrorism is also a political act. The legal ramifications on the 
international community, which must develop a foundation to confront 
transnational problems, require the efforts of the Department of State. Diplomacy 
will help craft national and international terrorism statutes (Sheehan, 2004, pp. 
102–103).   
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There has been previous cooperation between states on actions, which 
could be determined as terroristic. In September 1963, an international 
convention imposed an obligation on states to act if a hijacking has occurred or if 
one is going to occur (Barnidge, 2008, pp. 116–117).  “A universally accepted 
definition of terrorism” is necessary to provide a means for international 
cooperation in the legal realm (Aviles, 2006, p. 40). While there was already 
international agreement on general crimes, this set a precedent for future 
terrorism cooperation by instituting a foundation of common understanding. Legal 
actions against terrorists are supported by international and national laws. The 
guidelines and/or laws that have come out of the United Nations focus on those 
activities generally accepted as criminal and terrorist. These agreed-upon areas 
take away the murkiness from the lack of a definition of terrorism and will have a 
long-term effect in the fight against terrorism (Sheehan, 2004, p. 104). The 
interconnectedness of people, businesses, and countries, has effectively created 
a smaller world. Because this has happened in such a rapid fashion, the current 
structures are ineffective to confront these problems (Krishna-Hensel, 2006, p. 
1). The United States needs an organization which can react quickly to the 
changing environment.   
4. Lessons from the Business World 
Comparing a business model to a government organization can be a 
difficult exercise because of their fundamental differences. The vast majority of 
companies are seeking to make a profit. The government provides a service to 
the public either directly, such as the Social Security Administration, or indirectly, 
such as the FBI. However, one commonality is the need to manage resources. 
For companies, efficient management of resources typically equals greater 
profits. For government, savings can provide for more services, or, in a more 
cynical fashion, greater leverage against political opponents and competing 
federal agencies. Since this thesis is not focused on politics, the effectiveness 
and efficiencies will be examined.  
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Organizational efficiency has been the subject of research for many years. 
This research has produced new innovations with catchy names like Total 
Quality Management and Management By Objective. Some new trends become 
the norm while others fade away into obscurity. Studies in the business world are 
also highlighting the importance of achieving higher level understandings through 
alliances. Forming strategic alliances helps agencies gain knowledge through 
collaboration with others. This is commonly practiced by corporations in the 
business world (Larsson, Bengtsson, Henrikson, & Sparks, 1998, pp. 285–286). 
Generally, those practices that affect businesses will influence government 
operations.   
The research in the field of organizational theory has been conducted over 
a wide range including government agencies, for profit businesses, and non-
profit organizations. Because the current business environment has become 
more complex, the relationship between cooperation and competition has 
become more important. In order to be more competitive, companies are 
collaborating more with each other (Chen, 2008, p. 292). Clearly, if the business 
world has seen a need for cooperation, then government should look at its 
operations for potential adjustments. In the subsequent sections, these lessons 
and ideas are applied to the counterterrorism structure within the United States 
government for examination and review.   
5. Partnerships 
The simplest form of cooperation is often observed within a partnership. 
These arrangements are present throughout life in social, business, school, and 
government settings. They can be both formal and informal. Formal relationships 
usually involve legal responsibility and agreed-upon terms by both parties, while 
informal arrangements are less strict and easily breakable by either party. The 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2013) lists one of the definitions as “a 
relationship resembling a legal partnership and usually involving close 
cooperation between parties having specified and joint rights and 
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responsibilities.”  This definition will be utilized in this discussion as it contains 
aspects of the formal and informal.   
Partnerships are born out of a belief by two parties that a positive outcome 
will be achieved through their cooperation. Without this belief, there would be no 
incentive. However, the partnership itself is only beneficial if it is competently 
established. There is a direct correlation between the number of connections 
between two agencies and the benefits received. Specifically, these benefits 
manifest themselves in sharing of information, economies of scale, and the use 
of complementary skills. Within research companies, economies of scale are 
generated by the ability of the partner firms to tackle much larger projects than 
what they could do separately (Ahuja, 2000, p. 429). Pooling of resources, both 
knowledge and funds, allows companies the opportunity to address larger 
problems than acting alone. Gautam Ahuja’s research (2000), conducted in the 
chemical industry, was focused on the effect of direct ties, indirect ties, and 
structural holes, which are defined as “gaps in information flow.”  He identified 
and ultimately supported four hypotheses, which are identified as: 
• A positive impact of direct ties on firm innovation output;   
• A positive relationship between indirect ties and firm innovation 
output; 
• A higher number of direct ties reduces the impact of indirect ties; 
and 
• Structural holes reduce innovation output (Ahuja, 2000, p. 443). 
Through his research, Ahuja (2000) determined there was no single 
answer concerning the number of direct ties versus indirect ties, which would be 
optimal. The right structure depended on the mission and the organizations. For 
the purposes of this paper, it is important to note the final proven hypothesis that 
“structural holes reduce innovation output” (Ahuja, 2000). This is extremely 
relevant as information sharing was and continues to be a main point of criticism 
and review within the USIC.   
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In a similar study to Ahuja’s, the number of connections and realized 
benefits were compared (McCubbins, Paturi, & Weller, 2009). True coordination 
can occur between two agencies regardless of their management structure if 
there is a common benefit to both (McCubbins et al., 2009, p. 900). The study by 
Matthew McCubbins et al. highlighted the importance of connections when two 
groups were trying to complete an asymmetric coordination game. Participants 
were able to quickly solve a variety of problems when there was a common 
benefit. However, when there was not a common benefit, the ability to coordinate 
was heavily dependent upon the number of connections between agencies. They 
concluded that “an increase in the connectivity of the network leads to faster 
solutions” when there were asymmetric incentives (McCubbins et al., 2009, p. 
916). When there was an unequal benefit, the network structure played a more 
important role in the capability of the groups to solve their problem. In these 
scenarios, the number of connections between networks becomes extremely 
important. Therefore, they concluded that organizational designers could affect 
the success of the partnership based on how they created the networks 
(McCubbins et al., 2009, pp. 913–916).   
Additionally, a report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) addressed a prevailing culture wherein people had an internal focus to 
their own agency instead of the intelligence community as the whole. This was 
evident through the promotion process as most individuals looked to stay within 
their own organization. As a result, the ODNI highlighted the need for more joint 
duty programs (Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2008). However, 
organizations must not blindly enter into new, binding agreements. Before 
forming a partnership, the affected entities must consider a wide range of factors. 
These factors include the working environment, the selection and appropriate 
ratio of partners, and the value each partner will bring for the collective good. 
One of the key factors to consider is whether or not the partnership will create 
value. Only after potential value is estimated can an organization compare its 
costs of partnership to the value gained (Caudle, 2006, p. 4).   
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There is a distinction between a partnership and collaboration. Sharon 
Caudle opines that collaborative efforts are temporary agreements to solve 
specific problems (2006, p. 5). Caudle promotes the idea of a “high performance 
partnership” promulgated by the National Academy of Public Administration. The 
partnership is created only after each agency has assessed the strengths and 
weaknesses of both itself and other agencies. The goal for each agency is to 
determine if it will receive more value by joining the partnership than by staying 
alone. It is important to articulate a mission statement because it will become the 
foundation of future efforts within the partnership. The mission statement also 
serves as a notice to each partner to contribute their time, resources, and 
knowledge to accomplish the goal set before them (2006, pp. 4–6).   
Partnerships can be simple yet effective structures if designed and staffed 
appropriately. If a partnership fails, regardless of the reason, there could be a 
long term, negative effect between the participating organizations as they have to 
rebuild their trust and cooperation and determine the value of developing a new 
partnership. For example, a home construction company, Shea Homes chose to 
change the relationship with its subcontractors to more of a partnership; through 
this, they gained increased cooperation, lowered their construction times, and 
reduced delays (Covey, 2006). Shea Homes and their partners increased their 
profits (Covey, 2006).   
In another example in sports and marketing, Michael Jordan and Nike are 
in an elite class. In 1983, before Nike signed Jordan, their revenues were just 
$867 million (Rovell, 2013). In 2012, the Jordan brand of shoes captured 58 
percent of the basketball shoe market and had $2.5 billion in revenue (Rovell, 
2013). In the law enforcement realm, the National Academy of Public 
Administration recognized the power of joint operations and commended the FBI 
for its extensive network of joint task forces, such as the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTF) (National Academy of Public Administration, 2005, p. 21). 
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6. Teams 
Teams are not the same as working groups. Teams are “a small number 
of people with complementary skills who are committed to a common purpose” 
(Katzenbach & Smith, 1993, p. 112). Teams can be internal to a single 
organization and drawn from one or more departments. Moreover, they can also 
be external and comprised of people from multiple organizations. Because the 
present-day world is becoming more interconnected, it is important for 
organizations to establish teamwork and collaboration as priorities. A well-crafted 
team has the ability to adapt to changing situations. The synergistic effects of a 
team cause it to outperform the work of individuals (Noble, 2004, p. 2).   
The value added is typically the flexibility the team provides. Flexibility and 
adaptability have become key components in any successful strategy for 
businesses competing in the present-day dynamic and complex economic 
environment. To increase their effectiveness and efficiency, companies are 
moving toward team-based designs. Team design must be tailored to the tasks. 
If the incorrect resources and personnel are placed on the team, the business will 
not achieve high levels of desired performance (Jundt, Ilgen, Hollenbeck, 
Humphrey, Johnson, & Meyer  n.d., p. 3).   
The creation of teams is not a guarantee of success or true collaboration. 
A case study of self-managed teams at Xerox Corporation included an 
examination of 43 teams (Wageman, 1997, p. 32). Some teams were a team in 
name only as the members continued to accomplish their work just as they had 
prior to being assigned to a team. Moreover, they were not inclined to work 
collaboratively to improve performance or develop solutions. This independence 
was partially credited to hiring practices as Xerox looked for people who could 
work independently. When the Xerox Corporation changed its business model to 
a team process, the results were mixed (Wageman, 1997, p. 32). This level of 
individual independence is a significant factor for consideration regarding the 
formation of interagency teams within the USIC. Interagency assignments are not 
typically fully staffed because agencies do not have enough resources to staff 
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these positions, and many view these assignments as non-career enhancing 
(Martin, 2006, p. 7). The formation of a successful team must be supported by 
executive management in the affected organizations to the extent they are willing 
to commit resources and their personnel view the experience as positive.   
The Xerox Corporation study further revealed that team design was more 
important than the influence of the coach or leader (Wageman, 1997). The signs 
for self-management were more prevalent in the well-designed teams. While 
coaching had an influence on self-management, it was to a lesser degree. 
Furthermore, the effect of positive coaching was greater, once again, on well-
designed teams. The poorly designed teams effectively rejected coaching to the 
point that leaders could not influence the team. As further proof of the importance 
of the design of a team, ineffective coaches had a detrimental effect on poorly 
designed teams, but the well-designed teams were able to overcome coaching 
errors. The researcher identified seven critical success factors which could be 
observed in successful teams (Wageman, 1997, pp. 34–38).   
1. The team must have a sense of purpose and understanding of what 
they should do. The leader should ensure the group understands 
the goal, but then he/she must let the group determine how to 
accomplish the goal. 
2. There must be a goal which requires a team versus an individual 
approach. When people are needlessly put into a team, they will 
continue to operate as before. While this does not mean the team 
will be ineffective, it will also not result in gaining any competitive 
advantages through collaboration and synergy. Uncertainty causes 
the team to become confused about when to perform work 
collectively and when to perform individually. Members will tend to 
work separately when in doubt. 
3. Rewards should be given for team excellence and should be fairly 
distributed amongst the team members. The study indicated that 
groups which had a 50/50 mix of individual and group rewards were 
some of the lowest performers.   
4. Teams must have the basic resources. Resources should not be 
held until deemed necessary. Instead, leaders should be with their 
teams, decide what resources are necessary, and then supply them 
appropriately. 
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5. Teams must be given authority to make decisions. The team itself, 
upon knowing the goal, should be free to develop its work 
strategies and means to the goal. The leader has the authority to 
help establish boundaries, and these limits should be explicitly 
stated.   
6. The team’s performance goals should align with the ultimate 
objectives of the organization.   
7. The team’s culture should encourage strategic thinking. The author 
discusses the fact that all teams will naturally establish a set of 
norms defined as “the informal rules that guide team members’ 
behavior.”  Leaders must help form these norms to ensure they 
align with the organization’s objectives. 
The team design, which is paramount to the team’s success, requires an 
understanding of the mission and work environment. Organizations must spend 
an adequate amount of time in the design process. Self-managing work teams 
are not a universal solution or concept for all organizations (Spreitzer, Cohen, & 
Ledford, 1999, p. 359). Developing teams without a clear purpose could be 
detrimental to the mission as resources would be wasted and the subordinate 
team may work contrary to the broader organizational goals.   
The concept of teams is not new to the government. Within the FBI, task 
forces are very prevalent and meet the definition of a team. The FBI leads Safe 
Streets Task Forces to combat gang violence, Safe Trails Task Forces for crimes 
on Indian reservations, and Crimes against Children Task Forces to target child 
molesters and predators. These task forces bring together local, state, and 
federal resources to target specific crime problems which affect entire 
communities of people.   
7. Government 
Critiquing government agencies has become a norm in American society. 
The government, its agencies, and its politicians face criticisms across the 
political spectrum, from ObamaCare (Mangan, 2013) to foreign policy (In Our 
Opinion, 2013) to immigration reform (Wade, 2013). After the Iran Contra affair, 
the Tower Commission was established to investigate the activities of the CIA 
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and the executive branch. The commission reported many findings to Congress 
regarding the failures and deficient policies and procedures (Goodman, 1987, p. 
121). The many studies after 9/11 highlighted the failures of the USIC. Members 
of the USIC have been responding to these criticisms ever since. In 2003, the 
U.S. Army wrote a plan called, Strategic Plan for Army Knowledge Management. 
The plan highlighted the importance of shifting from traditional methods of 
operating to developing collaborative teams. The plan consisted of 13 principles, 
which the Army used to build a foundation for knowledge management. These 
principles can also be applied to the intelligence community (Stimeare, 2005, pp. 
7–8). Professionals within the USIC may agree operations and intelligence 
sharing could be smoother, yet the form of that change is hotly debated.   
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld understood the difficulties of creating the 
National Counterterrorism Center when he stated agencies would be forced to 
“give up some of their turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more 
efficient government wide joint effort” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States [9/11 Commission], 2004, p. 406). Personnel from the 
National Counterterrorism Center and the CIA argued over roles and 
responsibilities. Furthermore, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stymied the efforts of 
the Director of National Intelligence for the exchange of personnel between 
agencies (Zegart, 2007, p. 184). Clearly, sacrifices would have to be made, but 
the leader of each organization felt a duty to his/her home agency. To effect the 
necessary change, a strong argument must be presented that supports how the 
mission and contributing agencies would be positively enhanced and that 
government has the capability of working together.   
Russ Linden, University of Virginia, IBM Center for The Business of 
Government, completed a study of three federal agencies striving to unify their 
operations: the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of 
Transportation, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Within 
his research, Linden observed the traits and practices which brought about 
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“oneness.”  In his study of the collaboration of government agencies, Linden tried 
to answer these four questions (Linden, 2005, p. 11): 
1. What does it mean for a large federal organization to become 
“one”? 
2. What are some of the key hurdles in the quest for “oneness,” and 
how can those hurdles be anticipated and managed? 
3. Which strategies appear to work well?  What are some critical 
success factors? 
4. Is the effort worth it?  On balance, given the opportunity costs of 
engaging in this change initiative, given the vested interests in 
maintaining the status quo, do the benefits exceed the costs?  
Even though each case study was specific to a singular organization, the 
lessons learned can be applied to the USIC. Through his research, Linden 
identified several strategies for collaboration (2005, pp. 8–9).  
• Use both passion and systems to launch and sustain “one” 
initiatives. 
• Passion and systems are necessary but not sufficient; it is also 
necessary to apply a strong dose of accountability.  
• Use the initiative as a means to a larger end--if there is agreement 
on that end.  
• Do not keep the division at 30,000 feet; bring it down to earth. 
• Actively engage middle managers, where the biggest challenges 
and opportunities exist. 
• Create a constituency for the initiative.  
• Provide quality training--after the initiative is operating and the 
leaders have demonstrated their commitment. 
The USIC thrives on information gathering to counter enemy intentions, to 
guide policy, and to advise decision makers. Because organizations learn 
differently, procedures and processes must be altered, and the perspective of 
each organization must be toward collective learning. A measurement of success 
would be identifying knowledge obtained that would have been impossible 
without the alliance (Larsson et al., 1998, p. 287). As observed in Ahuja’s 
research, innovation increases when true collaboration is active and present.   
 25 
The USIC is comprised of agencies and people who want to protect the 
national security of the United States. Unfortunately, desire does not always 
equal success. There are times when collaborative teams will fail. David Noble 
identifies the following three reasons for failure: “inadequate resources, lack of 
knowledge of what to do, or unwillingness to do the work” (2004, p. 3). The lack 
of resources is a common theme in government agencies. In today’s economy, 
this factor may not change in the short-term. Therefore, the USIC must find ways 
to improve without an increase in resources. Creating more effective teams may 
be a mechanism to enhance the USIC counterterrorism capabilities. While many 
factors lead to success or the lack of success in a joint environment, stronger 
and more effective coordination should generally lead to better results (Barron, 
2000, p. 432). Because of increased competition and a changing business 
environment, businesses are recognizing the need to develop new strategies. 
While there are many reasons to try these processes, a common factor in all of 
them is the attempt to integrate more members of the team. Companies view this 
as a way to obtain greater innovation and commitment from their employees 
(Gollan & Davis, 1999, pp. 70–71). Partnerships, teams, and intra-agency units 
are normal within the government and business environment. However, the 
presence of a team is not always indicative of collaboration, mission sharing, and 
effectiveness.   
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis utilizes a qualitative analysis approach to explore the current 
structure within the United States Intelligence Community. Through an analysis 
of commentary and suggestions, the best approach to confront terrorism and 
government organizations, or reorganization, is still a debated topic. This debate, 
namely the lack of a “one-size fits all” answer to terrorism is paramount to the 
problem. After reviewing the arguments for different approaches to counter the 
terrorist threat, the researcher analyzed organizational concepts. This thesis 
identifies key points and studies from the business world which demonstrate 
important concepts for success in teams, partnerships, and government.   
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The concept of collaboration, what it is, how it is created, and why it can 
be a benefit, was then carefully scrutinized by the researcher. In addition, this 
research includes studies conducted by the government, private foundations, and 
academia, common practices for success will be identified. The researcher then 
developed a theme for the framework of an ideal multi-disciplinary unit.   
While this research is not designed to be a solution to all the questions 
and arguments being presented, the current structure will be examined in light of 
these points. Specifically, the ability of the United States to effectively target 
individuals and groups, regardless of their geographic location or criminal activity, 
and to mitigate their threat of terrorism is examined.   
The current agencies and units, which are focused on the counterterrorism 
mission, were analyzed through this lens of collaboration. An alternative 
proposal, incorporating the many standards of successful, collaborative units, will 
be suggested and then analyzed by the researcher using the same criteria 
applied to the existing entities. Finally, based upon this research, the researcher 
offers judgment will be made for the best way to move forward.   
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II. DEFINING TRUE COLLABORATION 
Information sharing and the absence of it have been debated since 9/11. 
During the 9/11 Commission hearings, a significant amount of time and energy 
was spent trying to determine what agencies knew, what agencies disseminated, 
and what agencies received. However, this was not just a phenomenon of 9/11. 
Multiple studies of the intelligence community conducted prior to 2001 articulated 
a combined 340 recommendations for intelligence reform. Ninety-four of the 
recommendations dealt specifically with improving “coordination across U.S. 
intelligence agencies and between these agencies and the rest of the U.S. 
government” (Zegart, 2007, p. 35). Interagency coordination has been practiced 
and discussed for many years, yet there is little authoritative guidance on how to 
be effective (Martin, 2006, p. 13). Information sharing and cooperation failures 
amongst intelligence agencies have frequently been cited as factors that led to 
9/11. There has yet to be a systematic study in why these failures persist (Scott 
& Jackson, 2008, p. 33). This research does not seek to conclusively answer the 
question why coordination seems difficult. Identifying the attributes of a highly 
collaborative organization and comparing those attributes to current and 
proposed agencies is the focus.   
The reasons for closer interaction are well documented. The Homeland 
Security Advisory Council (HSAC) stated, “The evolving complexity of our 
adversaries challenges existing paradigms” (2007). The traditional methods of 
conducting counterterrorism must be altered (Homeland Security Adivsory 
Council, 2007, p. 5). While the HSAC was focusing on the walls between federal, 
state, and local responders, their observation could be applied just as equally to 
interagency cooperation at the federal level. The Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) Commission determined the intelligence community did not lack the 
talent or tools, but it lacked the cohesive structure to use them effectively (2005). 
Specifically, it identified that there was insufficient coordination to conduct “critical 
intelligence functions-ranging from target development to strategic analysis” 
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(Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005). Coincidentally, the successes they did 
uncover were the result of interaction between agencies. Therefore, they 
concluded the USIC should become “better integrated and more innovative” 
(Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005, pp. 309–312). These calls for closer 
coordination are not going unnoticed as many people believe interagency 
collaboration is instrumental for agencies to become more effective and efficient. 
Many agencies are entering strategic alliances to reduce costs; however, others 
have chosen to remain independent (Thomas, Hocevar, & Jansen, 2006, p. 1). 
Within the USIC community, there are highly functioning teams, dysfunctional 
teams, and teams that are best described as non-existent. The goal is to identify 
those areas in which a team would create new successes.    
The maximum amount of collective learning is achieved as people work in 
a joint environment. This allows the easy transfer of knowledge in both general 
and specific contexts. Of course, this environment also heightens the risk of one 
partner becoming selfish and more of a receiver of information than a giver of it. 
One barrier to collaboration, and therefore collective learning, is trust. Each 
partner must believe the other is not seeking to exploit the relationship for their 
own selfish good (Larsson et al., 1998, pp. 292–296). Within the USIC, this can 
become an issue as each agency fights for more resources and more protection 
of its role in the counterterrorism mission. This issue of trust will have to be 
addressed in any collaborative framework.   
A. COLLABORATION VERSUS COOPERATION 
To accomplish successful agency interaction, it is important to articulate 
what collaboration is and is not, what the barriers are, what it would look like in 
an organization, and how it would affect performance. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) defines collaboration as, “any joint activity that is 
intended to produce more public value than could be produced when 
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organizations act alone” (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005, p. 4). 
Within the post 9/11 dialogue, words such as collaboration, coordination and 
cooperation have been frequently spoken. These words, and the ideas 
associated with them, are not the same. Coordination is the least intrusive style, 
and it primarily is acted upon to prevent agencies from targeting the same 
subjects, criminal activities, and missions. In a cooperative environment, 
agencies concentrate on their own missions, but information flows more freely 
and is more readily available to assist other agencies. Organizationally, 
collaboration moves well beyond coordination and cooperation. By its definition, 
collaboration requires agencies to commit resources to a combined and agreed 
upon mission (Leavell, 2007, pp. 43–45). It is not an impossible goal to attain. 
Collaboration between people is a normal, interactive process, and it has 
become both a necessity and a resource in today’s work environments (Barron, 
2000, p. 403). A company can stress both its productivity and its people through 
common vision and positive interaction. Through cooperation, both the needs of 
the individual and the organization can be met. The reinforcement of these 
elements becomes precursors for successful collaboration (Tjosvold & Tsao, 
1989, p. 194). The pursuit of a collaborative USIC must be a primary goal.   
Despite the potential advantages, fostering a collaborative environment is 
not an easy task. In a report to the United States Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the GAO stated the following:   
Agencies face a range of barriers when they attempt to collaborate 
with other agencies. One such barrier stems from missions that are 
not mutually reinforcing or that may even conflict, making reaching 
a consensus on strategies and priorities difficult. Another significant 
barrier to interagency collaboration is agencies’ concerns about 
protecting jurisdiction over missions and control over resources. 
Finally, interagency collaboration is often hindered by incompatible 
procedures, processes, data, and computer systems. Instead, 
federal agencies carry out programs in a fragmented, 
uncoordinated way, resulting in a patchwork of programs that can 
waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and 
limits the overall effectiveness of the federal effort. (2005, p. 2) 
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Adding to these barriers are the adversarial attitudes prevalent between 
agencies. There has been continual rivalry between various members of the 
USIC, including the FBI, CIA, and the DoD. Collections and operations naturally 
cross over jurisdictional lines as terrorists operate on both foreign and domestic 
soil. There has also been a historic rivalry between the CIA and DoD because 
the Director of Central Intelligence used to oversee the intelligence community, 
yet the Defense Secretary controlled 80 percent of the spending budget. The 
DoD still maintains that it must be in control of any intelligence operations 
affecting military actions (Lowenthal, 2006, pp. 45–46).   
Not only do agencies protect their turf, but individuals also seek to hold 
their positions. The power or authority maintained by people within an 
organization is an inhibitor to change as those people do not want to give up their 
positions. This power does not necessarily mean hierarchical authority. Instead, it 
could also be a skill possessed by people. The routine operations of an 
organization create resistance to change. As employees become familiar with 
their jobs, they perform many of their functions with little to no conscious thought. 
Therefore, the employees miss clues about the need to change (Kelman, 2005, 
pp. 25–26). Even with the ever-changing environment of counterterrorism work, 
the mission can become tedious and routine. Intelligence is collected, intelligence 
is analyzed, and intelligence is disseminated. The number of people doing the 
field work is limited whereas most resources are expended in the other functions 
of the intelligence cycle. Motivating individuals and agencies to seek 
improvement in processes is difficult.   
B. TEAMWORK 
A sense of team must be established. A truly collaborative environment 
would celebrate successes and address failures together. The purpose would not 
be to bring two separate groups to add the sum of their parts, but to create a 
structure with a synergistic value wherein the sum is greater than the parts. In a 
bureaucratic environment in which organizations are fighting for funding and 
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resources, collaboration is sometimes difficult to sustain. Furthermore, the hope 
would be that creativity is fostered to counter new enemy tactics (Leavell, 2007, 
pp. 44–45). This speaks directly to one of the criticisms highlighted by the 9/11 
Commission. The report from the 9/11 Commission wrote a statement that has 
been repeated many times. It stated, “the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of 
failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management… it is therefore 
crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of 
imagination (9/11 Commission, 2004, pp. 339–344). To realize this goal, the 
USIC must harness the natural advantages of teams.   
This concept of teamwork and success has even been demonstrated in 
elementary age children. In a study conducted with two groups of sixth grade 
students, there were several interesting findings about their ability to coordinate 
their work and find a solution (Barron, 2000, pp. 430–431). Group 1, which 
solved the problem, created a dynamic in which each member contributed to the 
solution while the other members listened to them. Although both groups 
sometimes lost shared focus on the problem, group 1 collectively came back to 
focus their attention on the problem. As group 1 solved parts of the problem, 
each member would concentrate their attention on that part of the solution plus 
consider how it played into the overall success of the problem. Group 2 did not 
share this level of coordination. The workbook, which contained the problem, 
became the focus of a battle for possession rather than solution. Overall, group 1 
displayed characteristics of shared goals and the alignment of tasks to meet the 
goals. Group members both confirmed answers of other members and also 
expanded their thought processes by hearing other ideas. Group 2 tended to be 
uncoordinated, and their interactions were very disjointed. Partly as a result of 
the lack of unity, group 2 did not successfully solve the problem (Barron, 2000, 
pp. 430–431). The amount of coordination and collaboration between the 
members within each group had a marked contrast when compared to each 
other. Group 1 showed a level of collaboration which allowed the group as a 
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whole to keep members on track even when they started to lose focus. True 
collaboration had a direct effect on success.   
There are many factors that affect how a group interacts. Typically, 
individuals in a diverse group will seek individuals with whom they share 
commonalities. These interactive patterns will begin to develop at the onset of 
the group (London & Sessa, 2007, p. 355). Group interaction is a fluid and 
constantly changing phenomena as tasks are accomplished, roles are set, and 
communication is established (London & Sessa, 2007, p. 356). During a study of 
work teams in service organizations, the importance of team characteristics was 
noted. The authors concluded, “the best teams had clear norms, were able to 
coordinate their efforts, and developed innovative methods aimed at improving 
their work methods” (Spreitzer et al., 1999, p. 355). This characterization could 
have been used to describe group 1 in the previous chapter and its success.   
Team members and agencies must commit to a free exchange of 
information. One observation noted in the studies is that there can be a 
competitive disadvantage depending upon the transparency and receptivity of the 
companies seeking to form a strategic alliance. If either of the companies is not 
transparent with their information, the “collective learning” is decreased (Larsson 
et al., 1998, p. 286). Partnerships are enhanced through the constant interaction 
and shared experiences of employees. The interaction also encourages the 
agencies to open up their databases of information to the other partners (Caudle, 
2006, p. 9). High transparency and receptivity are the key to maximize collective 
learning. Unfortunately, the competitive nature of companies creates barriers to 
their openness of information sharing which ultimately lessens the impact of the 
alliance (Larsson et al., 1998, p. 300). The USIC does not have the luxury of 
failure. Another attack on the scale of 9/11 will have deep and permanent 
repercussions on the USIC.   
Dean Tjosvold and Yuan Tsao (1989) conducted a study of four multi-
national companies to identify factors to increase productivity. They tried to 
determine if positive group values such as shared vision and common rewards 
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would create a more cooperative environment (Tjosvold & Tsao, 1989). The 
alternate hypothesis was negative group values would create competition. Within 
competition, there is a win or lose mentality among employees. As common 
sense would suggest, there was a relationship between productivity, 
coordination, cooperation and the perceived effectiveness of the employees. 
While it did not state emphatically that cooperation improves productivity, the 
study and others since then suggest there are links between the two elements 
(Tjosvold & Tsao, 1989, pp. 192–194). More recent studies suggest collaboration 
produces the best results. Common tasks shared by interdependent 
organizations are best accomplished through collaboration. In these instances, 
the organizations are able to learn how to effectively partner with one another. 
Unfortunately, collaboration does not always work even when it seems to be the 
most effective solution (Thomas et al., 2006, p. 2). It is important to understand 
why agencies do not collaborate when research indicates positive outcomes are 
realized.   
A constant roadblock on the path to change is people’s general resistance 
to change. This resistance increases in direct relation to the time in position of an 
employee. The other difficulty in government bureaucracies is the longevity of 
employment. Unlike private companies, employees of the government tend to 
stay longer and move less (Kelman, 2005, p. 29). The basic practices, 
observable in most bureaucracies, create resistance to change. The 
specialization of services has the adverse effect of not allowing people to see 
possibilities for creative change. If a decision is not in the scope of an employee’s 
position, they will generally seek counsel from a supervisor higher in the chain of 
command. This limits the ability of the employees to grow because they never 
make decisions outside of their job description (Kelman, 2005, p. 27). Even if the 
individuals come together in a cohesive environment, the team may not be a 
success.   
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C. FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION 
It is difficult to predict the success or failure of a group based upon the 
categorization of functional and dysfunctional processes. A dysfunctional group 
could have positive outcomes as the members learn and produce positive 
change. A functional group may strive for team harmony and reject ideas or 
concepts that conflict with this harmony (London & Sessa, 2007, p. 355). 
Perceptions are instrumental in detecting the potency of a team. If team 
members felt they had the ability and resources to accomplish the mission, they 
would put forth the effort to succeed (Kennedy, Loughry, Klammer, & Beyerlein, 
2009, p. 75). It is important for each person in a collaborative process to both 
understand the overall task and how their capabilities can contribute to a 
resolution (Weber & Khademian, 2008, p. 440). This idea of ownership has a 
resounding effect on personnel. It allows them to fashion the team which fits their 
operating image. Team members are more satisfied when they are given 
information about their performance and when they have a perception of their 
ability to make decisions (Spreitzer et al., 1999, p. 357). However, a leader is 
necessary to ensure the team continues to focus outward on the mission and not 
inward on the group’s survival.   
Leadership is another factor which contributes to the success of a team. 
Leaders have the ability to influence people to welcome and incorporate change 
in the workplace (Kelman, 2005, p. 62). Leaders who possess an in-depth 
knowledge of their agencies are able to lead the response by understanding the 
work processes and capabilities across multiple functioning lines. Through this, 
they can develop collaboration (Weber & Khademian, 2008, p. 456). Managers 
have more control over organizational characteristics than individual 
characteristics of a team member; therefore, they must seek to understand how 
the organization affects the success of a group (Kennedy, Loughry, Klammer, & 
Beyerlein, 2009, p. 75). Good leadership is a concept that unfortunately does not 
have a readily accepted description. Most people define good leadership by the 
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qualities they observed in a leader they liked or about whom they had positive 
feelings.1   
In a study of collaboration, Edward Weber and Anne Khademian reviewed 
and investigated the actions of managers in three different cases to determine 
how they sought out or used the collaborative process. Weber and Khademian 
used the term “collaborative capacity builder,” and they noted the successful 
individuals recognized the need to be a facilitator crossing many organizational 
boundaries (2008, p. 434). Furthermore, they concluded the collaborative 
capacity builders adopted six similar practices, as identified:   
1. Understand the task in basic terms and communicate it clearly; 
2. Balance innovation with accountability; 
3. Engage public, private, and political landscapes as part of capacity 
building; 
4. Cross boundaries frequently and with ease; 
5. Utilize established relationships based on experience and trust, and 
work to create new trust-based relationships as essential 
dimensions of capacity; and 
6. Employ substantive policy knowledge; know the task and 
environment from the inside out-experience counts. (Weber & 
Khademian, 2008, p. 434) 
The traits articulated in the above research are very similar to the findings 
of a 2005 GAO study. The GAO identified several practices which would help 
agencies collaborate with each other, as follows: 
• Define and articulate a common outcome. Agencies must have a 
defining reason to collaborate together. They could be forced to 
collaborate through congressional action or voluntarily choose to do 
so because of the benefit they may both receive from collaboration. 
At the onset, the agencies must have their employees cross agency 
lines to develop their common focus and mission. This process will 
take time and commitment. 
                                            
1 This is my personal observation based upon four years in the military, two years with a Big 
6 public accounting firm, and over 16 years in the FBI. Employees rate their leaders based upon 
characteristics to which they are attracted and oftentimes in spite of whether the leader was 
effectively accomplishing the mission.  In a similar vein, a personal friend who is a minister told 
me that people rarely remember the sermons, but they remember if the sermons were effectively 
and charismatically delivered.   
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• Establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies. 
• Identify and address needs and leverage resources. Because 
agencies have different strengths and weaknesses, the value of 
collaborative effort is combining these strengths for the common 
good. 
• Agree on roles and responsibilities, including leadership. The 
unified team has developed plans and procedures for leadership 
and taskings. These efforts will help the team overcome operational 
barriers.   
• Establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to 
operate across agency boundaries. Not only are there technical 
and administrative matters which must be made compatible, but 
also agencies have different cultures which must be mashed 
together. One way to accomplish this is through frequent 
communication. 
• Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the 
results. The agencies must develop a set of metrics to allow them 
to measure the success of their collaborative efforts. Through these 
metrics, managers will have criteria to help them gauge where 
improvements are needed.   
• Reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts. 
Collaboration must become a part of agencies’ strategic plans. This 
will help ensure that during the planning process, agencies are 
looking toward how collaboration will help them accomplish their 
mission as well as the overall mission of a government.  
• Reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts. In order 
to assure senior executives place the appropriate amount of 
emphasis on interagency collaboration, the Office of Personnel 
Management has required this element in performance plans. 
Agencies must and should hold their executives accountable to this 
standard. (2005, p. 23) 
There are many common factors in these two lists. Some of the underlying 
themes include relationship building, trust, and crossing organizational lines. 
Focusing on these as deliverables in the team framework should increase the 
chances for success.   
The relationship between collaboration and success has been studied in 
many venues. While there is no exact formula to calculate success or failure in 
collaboration, several factors affect it. These include “competition/territoriality and 
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lack of familiarity, inadequate communication, and distrust” (Thomas et al., 2006, 
pp. 9). These factors blend together and often exacerbate each other. To counter 
these negative influences, organizations seeking effective partnerships must 
create opportunities to increase their collaborative capacity (Thomas et al., 2006, 
pp. 9–10). If the team has a natural mindset to succeed, members will tend to 
solve their own problems. Therefore, organizational leadership must strive to 
enhance the team’s view of itself. Leaders must be careful not to confuse what 
they believe is necessary for success with what the team believes is necessary. 
However, managers should look for ways to help persuade the team to move 
within the organization’s strategy (Kennedy et al., 2009, p. 89). Joint activities 
can occur through long-established teams or leadership meetings. However, 
these joint activities do not ensure that collaboration has occurred unless there is 
meaningful progress (GAO, 2005, pp. 6–7). Specifying the metrics of success is 
a first step in the evaluation of a collaborative effort.   
Success should be defined within the context of the mission. The power, 
and ultimate goal, of strategic alliances in the learning process is through the 
generation of new ideas and understanding as organizations share their 
information. Each agency gains from the creative breakthroughs of the other 
partners without the necessity to spend time and resources learning available 
knowledge. The common mindset of organizations must be adjusted in a 
strategic alliance. Typically, firms look at collaboration and competition as polar 
opposites. If a firm seeks to be collaborative, they will lose a competitive 
advantage. However, what is missing from this viewpoint is a measure of new 
knowledge that could be gained in a collaborative environment (Larsson et al., 
1998, pp. 289–290). USIC agencies must rid themselves of the competitive 
culture. Ultimately, the mission is the same for all of the USIC, which is to protect 
the national security of the United States.   
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D. ONE MISSION 
A profound statement was contained within the WMD Commission report 
(2005), and it speaks to the point of this concept of one mission. The WMD 
Commission wrote the following: 
We begin with an important reservation about terminology. The 
term information “sharing” suggests that the federal government 
entity that collects the information “owns” it and can decide whether 
or not to “share” it with others. This concept is deeply embedded in 
the Intelligence Community’s culture. We reject it. Information 
collected by the Intelligence Community—or for that matter, any 
government agency—belongs to the U.S. government. Officials are 
fiduciaries who hold the information in trust for the nation. They do 
not have authority to withhold or distribute it except as such 
authority is delegated by the President or provided by law. As we 
have noted elsewhere, we think that the Director of National 
Intelligence could take an important, symbolic first step toward 
changing the Intelligence Community’s culture by jettisoning the 
term “information sharing” itself - perhaps in favor of the term 
“information integration” or “information access.” (Commission on 
the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005, p. 430) 
Collaboration among USIC agencies will not be a simple task. 
Government agencies still battle employees who do not share information for 
their own personal gain. Furthermore, many government employees do not 
understand their agency’s mission and how their work enhances omission. 
Linden described government agencies as, “a collection of tribes. Each has its 
own language, rites, rituals, symbols, [and] traditions” (2005, p. 10). Solid, 
experienced leadership is crucial because the management of strategic alliances 
creates new challenges. To prevent the exploitation of any partner, agreements 
regarding joint supervision and conflict resolution are important. Any selfish 
incentive for partners to disengage from the alliance after receiving its benefit 
must not be tolerated (Larsson  et al., 1998, p. 287). The goal is challenging but 
not impossible. There are examples of both failure and success already 
operating within the USIC.   
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III. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 
The USIC was destined to be altered after the events on 9/11. The real 
debate was not whether the USIC would change but the extent of the change. In 
some respects, the attack was this generation’s version of Pearl Harbor. The 
ramifications would be felt for years to come after the airplanes slammed into the 
Pentagon, Pennsylvania field and World Trade Center Towers. During the 
ensuing review, there was a significant amount of political wrangling, reputation 
saving, and turf protection. The resulting actions had both vocal proponents and 
opponents.   
In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, former CIA Director George 
Tenet described the successes of the CIA prior to 9/11. In the late 1990s, the 
directors of the FBI and CIA held “gang of eight meetings” to increase the 
coordination between agencies. They also decided to exchange senior officials. 
Yet, this exchange did not receive acceptance by the designated senior officials 
(Zegart, 2007, p. 78). Furthermore, Mark Lowenthal opined that no study has 
concluded that pertinent information known prior to 9/11 that could have 
disrupted the plot was not shared (2006, p. 238). Both Lowenthal and former 
Director Tenet were former CIA employees, and these responses have a sense 
of protectionism. To understand where the USIC should be in the future, it is 
necessary to look at the current structure as a result of the changes since 9/11. 
This structure will be compared to the best practices of teams, partnerships, 
coordination, and collaboration as described in the previous sections.   
A. CIA’S COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 
At the time of the 9/11 attacks, two main organizational structures were in 
place to target terrorists. These were led by the FBI and the CIA. The FBI was 
the lead agency directing and supporting JTTF’s around the country. The CIA 
housed the Counterterrorism Center (CIA/CTC). The CIA/CTC was originally 
framed to be a center where intelligence organizations, including the FBI, could 
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join resources to combat terrorism (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 75). In his 
testimony before the 9/11 Commission, former CIA Director George Tenet 
described the successes of the CIA prior to 9/11. One of the successes he 
mentioned was a focus on exchanging CIA and FBI senior officials to improve 
interagency cooperation (Zegart, 2007, p. 19). This cooperation extended beyond 
just the transfer of headquarters managers.   
One of the early units in the CIA/CTC started in the 1990s. In 1996, the 
United States government officially decided Osama Bin Laden was a threat to 
national security. President Clinton decided the government would pursue Bin 
Laden through judicial means. However, this did not mean the CIA was excluded 
as the CIA established Alex Station which was staffed by the CIA, the FBI, and 
other government agencies. In fact, in 1995, New York FBI Division JTTF agents 
met with members of the CIA/CTC to discuss Osama bin Laden. They realized 
the CIA had amassed a significant amount of information about him (Miller, 
Stone, & Mitchell, 2002, pp. 148–150). This unit enjoyed early successes in 
gaining knowledge about Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda (Zegart, 2007, p. 77). 
Given the commentary and conclusions by the 9/11 Commission, the CIA/CTC 
did not meet the expected standard. When the CIA created the CIA/CTC, it was 
designed to overcome bureaucratic hurdles. Unfortunately, the CIA/CTC 
succumbed to the usual battles over jurisdiction and operations (Miller et al., 
2002, p. 129).   
Through the inclusion of joint duty detailees from across the USIC, the 
CIA/CTC creates numerous direct ties between organizations. These direct ties 
can create a benefit to both agencies as strategies and tactics are developed and 
implemented. The direct ties also reduce structural holes, defined as “gaps in 
information flow” (Ahuja, 2000, p. 443), which increases the probability that the 
decision-makers and operators have access to the most current intelligence. The 
CIA/CTC has been given the authority, the resources, and the accountability for 
orchestrating the CIA’s contribution to the counterterrorism mission. These 
characteristics are similar to the observations in successful teams (Wageman, 
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1997, pp. 34–38). The framework also meets the GAO definition of collaboration, 
specifically “any joint activity that is intended to produce more public value than 
could be produced when organizations act alone” (2005, p. 4). The joint duty 
personnel are given access to CIA databases, personnel, and mission essentials 
which fosters a true team environment.   
The CIA/CTC is still a functioning center that has enjoyed many 
successes since 9/11, but it does not meet all the standards for a highly 
collaborative center. The CIA/CTC is a CIA run center. There are many different 
agencies, including the FBI and DoD, which send personnel to the CIA/CTC for 
joint duty assignments. While the joint duty personnel have the ability to more 
easily reach out to their own agencies, the role is highly diminished. The 
personnel maintain their chain of command back to their home agencies. The 
primary responsibility is for coordination and de-confliction. As documented 
earlier, the goal of coordination is to prevent duplication of effort or conflicts 
(Leavell, 2007, p. 43). Also, there is limited number of joint duty personnel 
assigned to the CIA/CTC in comparison to the number of CIA personnel 
assigned. As a result, group consensus is often swayed by numbers. Also, the 
detailees are not always given the authority by their home agencies to make 
decisions without consulting with their home agencies. When this occurs, their 
role is reduced to that of a messenger. A successful team has the authority to 
make decisions within the team (Wageman, 1997, pp. 34–38).   While this 
coordination definitely adds value to the USIC mission, there is no synergistic 
benefit. The CIA/CTC is an effective organization, but it does not meet the 
perfect standard of highly collaborative organization with access to all threat 
mitigation options.   
B. FBI’S JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE 
Combating traditional crimes was the impetus behind the first FBI task 
forces. At a time when the FBI was still being accused of not cooperating with 
local law enforcement departments, the New York Division of the FBI changed 
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the norm. The task force concept began with a joint task force between the FBI 
and the New York Police Department (NYPD) to investigate bank robberies. After 
observing the success of this task force, the first JTTF was created (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, 2005). A Deputy Inspector 
with the NYPD stated the following, “the key to the success of the JTTF concept 
remains the melding of personnel from the various law enforcement agencies 
into a single, focused unit” (Martin, 1999, p. 24). This mission focus is a common 
factor of successful teams (Wageman, 1997, pp. 34–38). The teamwork 
approach brought forth the strengths of each organization to the benefit of the 
JTTF as a whole. Combining the street skills of the NYPD officers and the vast 
investigative experience and reach of the FBI created a highly functioning team 
(Martin, 1999, p. 24). Interestingly, this statement was made before the attacks 
on 9/11 as the New York Division JTTF had been successful in a number of 
incidents and investigations. By 9/11, the FBI was operating 35 JTTFs around 
the country in major metropolitan cities (Mueller, 2011).   
The JTTFs continue to receive praise for their concept of operations and 
successes. The Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
completed a review of the various departmental terrorism task forces and 
councils and determined the task forces were effective and contributed to the 
counterterrorism mission (2005). The OIG also concluded the task forces were 
not duplicative, and they highlighted the inclusion of federal, state, and local 
partner agencies (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, 2005). 
Additionally, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) (2005) 
recognized the power of joint operations and commended the FBI for its 
extensive network of joint task forces. The panel believed joint operations were 
becoming the norm and would be critical to future national security investigations. 
The NAPA further recommended these joint task forces be extended to other law 
enforcement areas (National Academy of Public Administration, 2005, p. 21).   
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) recognized it was only through 
joint task forces that collaboration occurred (Office of Director of National 
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Intelligence, 2008). The assignment of officers from other agencies and 
investigative successes are indicators to the successfulness of the JTTF model 
(Goodman, 2008). Most recently, the JTTF in New York City was responsible for 
the investigation and arrest of Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis, who 
pled guilty to attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction (U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, Eastern District of New York, 2013). In 2012, Adel Daoud was arrested by 
the JTTF in Chicago, Illinois, as he attempted to detonate a car bomb which was 
filled with inert explosives purchased from an undercover officer (U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, Northern District of Illinois, 2012).   
One of the many strengths of the JTTFs is the flexibility offered to 
neutralize threats. By including state, local, and other federal law enforcement 
agencies, the JTTFs have the ability to pursue suspected terrorists through local 
criminal violations, federal violations, immigration proceedings and other means. 
This has been used many times since 9/11, yet it is predominantly for suspected 
terrorists located within the United States. The structure of a JTTF naturally 
creates a significant number of direct ties. Nationally, the FBI operates 103 
JTTFs in its field offices, with over 4200 non-FBI participants representing more 
than 600 state and local departments along with over 50 federal agencies (FBI:  
Protecting America from terrorist attack). These 4200 law enforcement personnel 
offer connections back to their own agencies for resources, intelligence, and 
experiences. Furthermore, the JTTFs become a single point of accountability for 
the counterterrorism mission on the local area. FBI headquarters relies on the 
local field office to work jointly with other departments to investigate possible 
threats and tips coming from local, national or international sources.   
The authority and accountability to coordinate and share the intelligence 
and investigative mission placed upon the local field office is another factor 
typically associated with successful teams (Wageman, 1997, pp. 34–38). Within 
the JTTFs, all officers are required to attend the training to ensure every 
participant has the same baseline knowledge of targets and techniques. Equality 
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and sufficiency of training is a key component for a collaborative team (Linden, 
2005, pp. 8–9). 
The National Academy of Public Administration recognized the strength of 
the FBI JTTF’s and the ever evolving environment in which they operate. 
Unfortunately, the panel also discovered a bureaucratic process which may 
impact the efficiency and effectiveness of these task forces. Because the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grants money to state and local 
agencies, there could be future coordination problems and duplication of efforts if 
these departments choose to operate outside of the JTTF (National Academy of 
Public Administration, 2005, p. 45). The JTTFs provide a strong presence for 
activities within the United States, but they have a limited reach overseas. For 
example, the FBI relies upon its contacts with the CIA and DoD in addition to its 
own network of Legal Attaché offices and foreign liaison partners. The level of 
involvement of intelligence partners on the JTTFs varies. As a result, some FBI 
field offices have dynamic relationships which are highly functioning. Other 
offices have more of a liaison contact than a partnership.   
 
Central Intelligence Agency U.S. Department of Commerce 
U.S. Department of Defense U.S. Department of Energy 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement Customs & Border Protection 
Transportation Security Administration U.S. Secret Service 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms U.S. Marshals Service 
Bureau of Prisons U.S. Capitol Police 
State Police State Highway Patrol’s 
National Guard State Attorneys Offices 
State Universities & Colleges State Departments of Justice 
Police Departments Sheriff Departments 
Transportation Authorities Utility Companies 
Table 1.   Listing of JTTF Participating Agencies 
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The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) was created in 2002 to 
ensure the effective and efficient administration of the investigative JTTF’s 
throughout the FBI. Its mission included the coordination of threats and leads 
between the field and headquarters. Similar to the field JTTFs, the NJTTF is 
comprised of the FBI and many different agencies. The OIG indicated that 
“during crisis situations, the NJJTF’s members support the FBI’s Strategic 
Intelligence Operations Center and provide information that addresses the crisis 
or terrorist act” (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, 2005). 
Yet, the NJJTF is primarily administrative in nature. It supports the field JTTFs 
request for funding and resources. While the participants aid in coordinating 
actions across agencies, they do not conduct investigations or source operations.    
C. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is a creation of the post 
9/11 debates and Congressional Acts. The 9/11 Commission believed America 
had the individual components necessary, but it lacked the organizational 
structure to unify these components. This disorganization was partially the 
catalyst behind the formation of the NCTC (Torres, 2007, p. 2). The 9/11 
Commission recommended the creation of the NCTC. In its recommendation, it 
wrote, “breaking the older mold of national government organization, this NCTC 
should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence.”  The 
NCTC would outline the responsibilities of the agencies; however, each agency 
would determine how they would fulfill their responsibilities (9/11 Commission, 
2004, pp. 403–404).   
On August 7, 2004, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 
13354 officially establishing the NCTC. There were five specific functions 
outlined in the order (Executive Order No. 13354, 2004).   
1. Serve as the primary organization in the United States Government 
for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired 
by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and 
counterterrorism, excepting purely domestic counterterrorism 
information.; 
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2. Conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism 
activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including 
diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and 
law enforcement activities within and among agencies;  
3. Assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies for 
counterterrorism activities that are consistent with applicable law 
and that support strategic plans to counter terrorism;  
4. Serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and 
suspected terrorists and international terror groups; and  
5. Ensure that agencies, as appropriate, have access to and receive 
all-source intelligence support needed to execute their 
counterterrorism plans or perform independent, alternative analysis.  
The NCTC has broad powers for receiving and analyzing information, but 
it is limited operationally. Function 3 specifically states, “The Center shall not 
direct the execution of operations” (Executive Order No. 13354, 2004). The 
NCTC has the authority and capability to review and analyze intelligence 
collected from every agency. Through this, it is able to develop a global picture of 
the terrorist threat. However, it cannot direct the operational activities of an 
individual agency (Jones, 2007, p. 12). It developed the national implementation 
plan for the war on terror. However, the chains of command and organizational 
lanes were not clearly defined for cohesive and unified action (Torres, 2007, p. 
3). The future will be the only indicator of whether the NCTC will be successful as 
currently designed.   
Director Redd described himself as the “mission manager” for the DNI. 
With this designation comes responsibility to ensure the intelligence community 
has a clear and coherent counterterrorism vision. The NCTC engages itself to 
ensure that emerging threats are assessed in terms of collection and mitigation. 
Specifically, the Interagency Task Force (IATF), led by the NCTC, focuses on 
these new threats. The IATF is comprised of the Departments of Defense, State, 
Homeland Security, and Justice. The IATF’s proposals are reviewed, approved, 
and altered by White House and senior staff officials (Confronting the Terrorist 
Threat, 2007). Finally, the principal deputies who serve as the leadership 
framework at the NCTC must be change agents. They must strive to develop a 
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focused and integrated strategy. However, after two years, the NCTC was still 
developing procedures for interagency cooperation (Reinwald, 2007, p. 11). 
Given the rapidly evolving face and character of terrorism, specifically Al Qaeda, 
this pace of change is unacceptable and works to the detriment of the security of 
the United States. 
Since its creation, the NCTC has tried to become mission focused. Former 
Director Redd testified that through the authority of the DNI, the NCTC was 
working to ensure agencies were not conducting duplicative work. Instead, they 
were assigning lead agencies to cover specific threats and to also ensure there 
was “competitive analysis” to enhance and temper analytical assessments. The 
NCTC recognized no singular agency could cover all topics (Confronting the 
Terrorist Threat, 2007). However, without functional authority over other USIC 
agencies, the NCTC cannot enforce its plans and must make requests not 
orders. Yet, two years after the creation of the NCTC, it still lacked appropriate 
resources and authority to accomplish the mission for which it was responsible. 
Additionally, it had not succeeded in its effectiveness and efficiency (Reinwald, 
2007, p. 1). This failure may not be a result of poor function but a flaw in the 
design.   
The NCTC possesses many of the characteristics observed in highly 
collaborative organizations. For some observers, the NCTC is considered a 
success story. Personnel from multiple agencies work together and draft 
analytical reports and assessments (Zegart, 2007, p. 186). Thomas et al. defined 
collaborative capacity as “the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and 
sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes” (2006, p. 
2). The NCTC continues to draw personnel from throughout the intelligence 
community into a continuing mission to oversee and drive all source analysis and 
strategies. FBI employees detailed to the NCTC work under the NCTC chain of 
command. During their assignment, they respond to NCTC, and not FBI, 
requirements. One of the strengths of the NCTC is the ability of the personnel to 
read and analyze all intelligence collected and maintained by the USIC. The 
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framework of the NCTC creates a significant number of direct ties as the various 
employees work together and reach back to their home agencies.   
The NCTC should not become a bureaucratic organization with strict lines 
of information flow and reporting. Communication should flow openly and rapidly 
in all directions. To accomplish this, trust must be developed between agencies 
(Stimeare, 2005, p. 5). Its organizational structure immediately was fraught with 
bureaucracy. The Director of the NCTC has two different reporting chains of 
command. The NCTC Director reports to both the president and the DNI 
(Lowenthal, 2006, p. 41). Additionally, the NCTC is comprised of personnel 
serving in joint duty and detailee assignments. As mentioned previously, these 
assignments are not always supported by management or sought after by 
employees. Many times, loyalty remains with the home organization. While it 
would be idealistic to state a person’s loyalty should be to the national security 
mission, it is not realistic. An essential element of the success of the NCTC is the 
acceptance of its value by agency heads. Leadership is the most important factor 
to attain interagency cooperation. While agencies have a measure of 
independence and their management positions are technically equals across the 
government spectrum, there must be a person in command, someone who is 
held accountable for and holds others accountable for joint action (Jones, 2007, 
p. 12).   
Regardless of motivation or persuasion, the NCTC is staffed and 
functioning. The mission of the NCTC is not operational in the traditional meaning 
of the word as it does not directly conduct intelligence collection, human source 
operations, or investigations. By design, as indicated in functions 1 and 2, the 
NCTC could be described as an analytical entity formulating the strategic 
portions of the counterterrorism mission. The NCTC focuses on high-level efforts 
and relies on other agencies to target identified threats and terrorists. For 
example, the NCTC created Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Teams (JCAT), 
which are the successors to the Interagency Threat Assessment and 
Coordination Group, to enhance intelligence sharing and to ensure terrorism 
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intelligence requirements were disseminated to all federal, state, and local 
agencies, who was in position to meet the requirements (National 
Counterterrorism Center, n.d.). People assigned to the JCAT do not directly 
collect the intelligence, but they assist in strengthening the intelligence collection 
process. While the NCTC serves a valuable mission for the United States, it is 
not the correct entity to oversee or operate against specific terrorists.   
D. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
Within the United States, the national security strategy is formulated at the 
presidential level. The goals and objectives cascade to the Cabinet level 
departments and their agencies to execute procedures to fulfill these objectives. 
Currently, there remains little to no oversight for implementation. Each agency 
designs its strategies based upon the portions of the national security strategy for 
which it is responsible.   Unfortunately, since there is no oversight, the individual 
plans for national objectives with two or more responsible agencies are not 
coordinated (Martin, 2006, p. 4). The DNI is technically the office to provide this 
oversight. The USIC framework was altered with the creation of the DNI. This 
office has power over both foreign and domestic agencies and the business of 
intelligence collection (Bay, 2008, p. 74). The position of the DNI was created in 
2004 under the authority of the National Intelligence Security Reform Act. The 
word “foreign” was purposefully left out of the title to demonstrate the DNI’s 
power over domestic activities, such as the FBI’s intelligence collection, as well 
(Lowenthal, 2006, p. 30). The presumption was the DNI would help the many 
agencies of the USIC to integrate.   
The topic of integration and coordination was a key discussion point in 
Congress. In his opening statement before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Ambassador John D. Negroponte (2005), candidate for the DNI, 
outlined several concerns regarding the intelligence community. One of his 
concerns was many different agencies had improved and enhanced their 
collection and capabilities; however, he did not see a coordinated effort which 
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should have been accomplished through the NCTC (Negroponte, 2005, p. 6). 
This type of effort was missing prior to 9/11 as noted in several reports, and 
many reforms were designed to remedy this shortfall. The first recommendation 
of the WMD Commission stated, “We recommend that the DNI bring a mission 
focus to the management of Community resources for high-priority intelligence 
issues by creating a group of ‘Mission Managers’ on the DNI staff, responsible for 
all aspects of the intelligence process relating to those issues” (Commission on 
the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 2005, p. 317). These mission managers could serve the 
coordinating role sought by Ambassador Negroponte. 
Ambassador Negroponte further stated the United States needed:  
…a single intelligence community that operates seamlessly, that 
moves quickly, and that spends more time thinking about the future 
than the past. We need the right mix of human and technical 
resources, providing us with a new generation of capable 
intelligence officers, analysts, and specialists, and innovative 
technologies. (Negroponte, 2005, p. 12)   
The DNI must be a strong authority over the national human collection of 
United States or they must delegate this authority. Without it, the USIC risks 
conducting operations targeting similar individuals and groups which would 
potentially cause the operations to be compromised (MacGaffin, 2005, p. 90). To 
accomplish this, the DNI must be given the necessary statutory and budgetary 
authority. Negroponte (2005) believed the DNI should be a value added 
departmental layer and help people excel by giving them the right opportunities 
and resources. He wanted to “ensure that our intelligence community is forward-
leaning, but objective, prudent, but not risk-adverse, and yet always faithful to our 
values and our history as a Nation” (Negroponte, 2005, p. 11).   
The FBI received significant criticism during the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks. This is partially due to the fact that the FBI was not sharing information 
even within its own organization. Although the FBI offered excuses such as lack 
of resources and the intelligence “wall,” it could not escape completely from its 
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culpability. Many people do not believe intelligence and investigative operations 
can coexist within one agency. Therefore, a separate domestic intelligence 
institution should be created (Leavell, 2007, p. 33).   
In November 2001, Ibn Shaikh Al Libby was captured in Afghanistan. 
While the FBI was interrogating him, a dispute arose whether or not he was 
withholding information. While the CIA wanted to turn him over to the Egyptians, 
the FBI wanted to maintain the ability to use his statements in court. Ultimately, 
the president decided to turn him over to the Egyptians after the CIA director and 
the FBI director argued over his fate (Miller et al.,  2002, p. 320). It is these 
specific types of issues the DNI was formulated to assist. One of the proclaimed 
problems leading to the attacks on 9/11 was the inability of the CIA, FBI, and the 
rest of the USIC to work together cohesively (Zegart, 2007, p. 4). However, the 
DNI must have a strong presence because each agency is trying to fulfill their 
specific portion of the mission as they have defined it.   
On September 10, 2007, Vice Admiral (ret.) John Scott Redd, then 
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, met with the United States 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. As part of 
his opening statement, Director Redd highlighted the need to improve 
intelligence collection, coordination with state and local officials, coordination 
amongst agencies, and budgeting and planning (2007). Information sharing and 
coordination were the same obstacles discussed in the 9/11 hearings years 
earlier.   
In his thesis, Ron Leavell hypothesized, “Our counterterrorism 
effectiveness will increase by adoption of a fully collaborative multi-level, multi-
discipline effort” (2007, p. 4). The underlying question is whether or not agencies 
merely speak of collaboration or do they actually practice collaboration. To 
achieve true collaboration, organizations will have to adhere to principles such as 
“joint governance, joint decision-making, and resource sharing” (Leavell, 2007, p. 
4). Over time, as organizations work together, their effectiveness should increase 
as they develop relationships and build trust with each other (Leavell, 2007, p. 4). 
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Historically, the agencies within the USIC have been unwilling to set aside their 
own interests to serve national interests (MacGaffin, 2005, p. 95). Through past 
experience, military doctrine emphasizes that participants engaging in joint 
operations must share a common understanding of relevant information including 
the environment, resources, and personnel. Of course, this task is entirely 
difficult yet extremely important for the NCTC given its wide range of operations, 
both in geography and scope (Stimeare, 2005, p. 13). The framework outlined 
above does not fully satisfy all the needs of the USIC.  
E. SUMMARY 
Strategic analysis of intelligence helps establish missions and policies. 
The DNI and NCTC are designed to attack these national level issues. The 
CIA/CTC and JTTFs focus on threat streams, specific terrorist groups, and 
individuals. What is missing is a collaborative unit compromised of personnel 
from the FBI, CIA, and the DoD to target individuals using all the available tools 
across the USIC spectrum. After the attacks of 9/11, everybody was quick to 
point blame at individuals. Yet within a bureaucracy, one individual does not 
always have the power to effect change. It is oftentimes an organizational and 
hierarchical problem (Zegart, 2007, pp. 6–8).   
The preceding sections were written to clarify the roles, responsibilities, 
and history of some of the different organizations operating in the CT mission. 
Each of the entities described above serve an important purpose in the 
counterterrorism mission. This research and analysis of them as highly 
functioning teams should not diminish or be read as a negative critique of their 
work. Whether they are described as highly functioning or missing the mark, their 
mission does not meet what is being proposed as an alternative, specifically a 
unit that crosses agency and discipline boundaries. The 9/11 Commission report 
and other studies have highlighted the United States government is deficient in 
its ability to lead and coordinate operations which cross agency boundaries 
(Jones, 2007, pp. 2–3).   
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The next section will provide a recommendation for a new group which 
pulls together all resources in a balanced unit that has the ability to effectively 
and efficiently use all mitigation and neutralization tactics. 
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IV. PROPOSAL 
The national security of the United States is a complex mission requiring 
the resources of multiple organizations. This inherent complexity is magnified by 
bureaucratic and patriarchal hurdles imposed by fusing together multiple 
agencies. When considering the addition of a new entity, it is entirely appropriate, 
if not a necessity, to evaluate the cost versus the benefit. After reviewing and 
studying the meeting of Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi in Kuala Lumpur 
and their subsequent travels, the 9/11 Commission concluded the United States 
government needed to develop a plan for joint operations (2004). They 
recognized the diverse plans and strategies of the USIC agencies. Furthermore, 
they knew the leadership challenges in the past would carry forward to the future 
(9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 357). In response to the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, the USIC has painfully worked through the creation and 
development of the DNI and DHS. These were monumental changes affecting 
the entire community. These changes were also met with stiff resistance and 
substantial obstacles in implementation. Small adjustments could have the ability 
to bring great success while causing only minor amounts of stress or change 
fatigue.   
The USIC has a current intelligence structure which encourages 
information sharing and cooperation. This was not the root problem within the 
USIC. Prior to 9/11, the agencies within the USIC did cooperate, but legitimate 
joint action was missing. The 9/11 Commission (2004) differentiated between 
cooperation and joint action by writing that cooperation was identifying a problem 
and seeking help to resolve it. On the other hand, joint action brings together the 
perspectives of all agencies to frame the problem, the potential solutions, and the 
roles and responsibilities of each agency (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 400). This 
continued cooperation, and in many respects increased cooperation, is a positive 
development. After the failures of 9/11, there was widespread agreement 
amongst both the politicians and the public that the USIC needed to be 
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restructured in some manner. A significant amount of time, resources, and 
money have been expended to increase information sharing and collaboration. 
Domestically, joint terrorism task forces have increased, and fusion centers 
throughout the United States have been created (Leavell, 2007, p. 25). The 
majority of studies have identified the value and necessity of increasing the 
number of joint duty assignments between agencies (Zegart, 2007, p. 38). Yet, 
the goal should be an increase in collaboration and joint operations not just 
information sharing.   
In this section, the High Value Interrogation Group (HIG) will be reviewed 
and analyzed using the same criteria previously identified. The HIG example will 
also help formulate the strategy for the development of an interagency targeting 
center for identified terrorists. In the chapter entitled, “What to Do?  A Global 
Strategy,” the 9/11 Commission wrote the following: “the United States should 
consider what to do - the shape and objectives of a strategy. Americans should 
also consider how to do it -organizing their government in a different way” (9/11 
Commission, 2004, p. 361). The 9/11 Commission was looking at a macro level 
at the lack of cohesion in strategy. These same words and idea could be used to 
review the USIC’s operations at a micro level. Fundamentally, every terrorist 
group is comprised of individual terrorists. While there are strategies to defeat the 
group itself, there will always be a need to address the individuals, particularly 
the leaders, technical experts such as bomb makers, and other influential 
members. This micro level execution would be served by a national targeting 
center. As previously noted, the end of a terrorist group is usually the result of 
more than one factor (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 10).   
Creating a framework for change is difficult especially when it requires 
adherence by more than one agency. Intelligence failures would be easy to fix if 
the root cause was leadership (Zegart, 2007, p. 10). A national strategy is only as 
effective as its execution, and execution remains a major challenge. It hinges on 
the capability of all participating organizations to integrate shared operations and 
objectives while maintaining their independence. As it strives for inclusion in the 
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planning process, the DoD wrote an annex to its plan which outlined the duties of 
other agencies which affected the DoD. However, this was just a plan on a piece 
of paper because the DoD does not have the authority to command other 
agencies to fulfill their duties (Martin, 2006, p. 6). According to Sims and Gerber, 
“True intelligence transformation fuses wit, creative business practices, and 
selected technologies for the purpose of achieving strategic advantage (2005a, 
p. x). The author is also keenly aware that not all change is good. In the midst of 
change, a “bias for action” sometimes occurs as positive feedback encourages 
additional change. As the leadership exerts their influence, the cycle of action 
and positive feedback continues (Kelman, 2005, pp. 203–204). The national 
targeting center would include input of authority, responsibility, and strategy by 
the participating agencies.   
A. CURRENT HIGH VALUE INTERROGATION GROUP 
One of the success stories for the USIC is the formulation of the High 
Value Interrogation Group. Its creation was not necessarily a result of the 
recognition that the agencies needed to work more closely together. Instead, a 
major catalyst was the many interrogation scandals which impacted the USIC, 
the United States, and U.S. relationships with some foreign partners. Senator 
Patrick Leahy praised the Presidential Administration’s decision to have the FBI 
lead the HIG because the FBI has a “long history of proven success in 
interrogation without resorting to extreme methods that violate our laws and our 
values” (2009). Regardless of the reasons behind the formation, it can be used 
as model for successful collaboration. On the FBI website, the HIG is described: 
The High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) is an 
interagency body, housed within the NSB [National Security 
Branch], and staffed with members from various IC [Intelligence 
Community] agencies. Its mission is to gather and apply the 
nation’s best resources to collect intelligence from key terror 
suspects in order to prevent terrorist attacks against the United 
States and its allies. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.) 
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The HIG is an assimilation of experts from the USIC, the law enforcement 
community, and the Department of Defense. These experts include intelligence 
analysts, officers, FBI Special Agents, interrogators, and translators. The HIG 
consists of multiple teams capable of deploying on short notice to interrogate 
captured terrorism subjects. While intelligence collection would be the focus, the 
HIG would possibly be able to preserve the ability to glean evidence for a 
criminal prosecution (Department of Justice, 2009). In the past, many of the 
interrogations were conducted by the agency which maintained primary 
jurisdiction for the area of capture. For instance, arrests and/or detentions on 
United States soil were controlled by the FBI or another law enforcement agency. 
If the capture occurred overseas, either the CIA or DoD would be the lead 
agency depending upon whether it was a country with whom the United States 
was as at war, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, or other sovereign countries like 
Pakistan. Frequently, the agency with jurisdiction followed its own set of rules 
and guidelines with little thought to how that method would affect future control of 
the terrorist. The goal was simply the collection of intelligence. Unfortunately, this 
methodology has contributed in part to the many detainees in Guantanamo Bay 
who cannot be prosecuted because of a lack of evidence.   
The case against Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas-day bomber, 
was one of the first chances to demonstrate the HIG’s value. Abdulmutallab tried 
to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear while traveling on a Northwest 
Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day (White, 2012). Dennis 
Blair, then Director of National Intelligence, faulted the decision to immediately 
interview Abdulmutallab using Miranda warnings, which are warnings provided to 
criminal suspects (Hsu & Agiesta, 2010). DNI Blair stated, “That unit was created 
exactly for this purpose—to make a decision on whether a certain person who’s 
detained should be treated as a case for federal prosecution or for some of the 
other means” (Hsu & Agiesta, 2010). In his opinion, the HIG should have been 
used in this case (CNN Wire Staff, 2010), and he stressed that, in the future, the 
HIG would be utilized in both overseas and domestic cases (Hsu & Agiesta, 
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2010). He slightly backed down from his remarks in future interviews, but he truly 
wanted the HIG involved in all discussions regarding intelligence versus evidence 
collection during interrogations of captured suspects (Hsu & Agiesta, 2010). In 
addition, FBI Director Mueller defended the FBI’s actions amidst the chaos. He 
further commented that “‘there was no time’” for other alternatives (Lake, 2010).    
The HIG is a model of collaboration in its structure. While it is 
administrated by the FBI (Ghosh, 2009), the HIG was designed to bring together 
experienced interrogators and experts from the USIC (Department of Justice, 
2009). The primary mission of the team is to gather intelligence from detained 
persons regarding additional bomb plots or conspirators. Yet, the team will also 
try to preserve evidence for prosecution, if feasible (Dozier, 2011; Department of 
Justice, 2009). Through interagency coordination, the teams would be able to 
deploy on their interrogation assignments with the necessary subject matter 
expertise and experience (Department of Justice, 2009).   
Bringing together experts from different fields and agencies, the HIG has 
also been tasked with researching and developing the most effective 
interrogation strategies (Dozier, 2011). Since the participants are part of the 
same group, they have the knowledge of what skills each brings to the mission 
and the personal relationship to ask for assistance and guidance. Requests do 
not have to be processed through other headquarters personnel.   
The HIG hits many of the markers of partnerships, teams, and 
collaboration, as articulated in the previous sections. Reviewing Ahuja’s research 
(2000), the HIG has developed direct and indirect ties, which increases its 
chance to conduct successful and productive interrogations. As a team, its 
purpose has been stated, and each entity has agreed to the joint endeavor. Also, 
because of the importance of the mission, teamwork is absolutely essential. The 
HIG was designed to be the center for strategic planning of interrogations and 
the focal point for determining the strategy of each interrogation (Department of 
Justice, 2009).   
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One limitation of the HIG is clearly evident. The formation of the HIG was 
focused on preparing for an interrogation. The subject set for the HIG were those 
terrorists whom the USIC believes will be captured or detained. The missing 
component is a unified effort to target known terrorists for detention, capture, or 
kill operations. The HIG should be praised for its proactive stance in preparing for 
future, anticipated interviews. However, the USIC needs a unit which brings 
together the USIC agencies in a proactive, equal team to target terrorists using 
every unique resource available to the participating agencies.   
B. PROPOSED NATIONAL TARGETING CENTER 
The 9/11 Commission noted many singular items of failure such as lack of 
information sharing, poor analysis, and ineffective operations. Interestingly, they 
viewed the failures as symptoms of a greater problem, which was the United 
States lacked the structure to manage missions which cross national borders. 
There was no singular person or unit which was able to pull together all available 
intelligence on a given threat (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 353). The key is to 
develop a unit with an unlimited flow of information and ideas. This type of 
system was not evident prior to 9/11. The organizational framework of 
intelligence made it difficult to share information between agencies (Zegart, 2007, 
p. 112). Yet, flexibility and adaptability must become key characteristics.   
Terrorism will not be eradicated through one discipline. The types of 
actions committed by terrorists and their associated groups differ. The actions by 
the United States government prior to 9/11 highlighted the inability of the United 
States to confront an asymmetric threat. The traditional method was to counter 
individuals through law enforcement means and nations through diplomacy and 
war. However, Al Qaeda did not fit either typology as it was neither an individual 
nor a country (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 348). Learning about a specific terrorist 
plot is nearly impossible. It is more important for intelligence to learn about the 
groups, individuals, cells, etc. The systematic disabling of terrorist organizations 
terrorist by terrorists, cell by cell, is an effective means to operate. If a cell is 
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disrupted, any plots that cell may have been planning are disrupted. Many 
terrorists commit other crimes when they are plotting their attack. These can be 
exploited through legal means (Pillar, 2004, pp. 117–118). The diffuse work of 
the enemy requires a broad and evolving strategy.   
A national strategy hinges on the capability of all participating 
organizations to integrate shared operations and objectives while maintaining 
their independence (Martin, 2006, p. 6). After reviewing and studying the meeting 
of Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi in Kuala Lumpur and their subsequent 
travels, the 9/11 Commission (2004) concluded the United States government 
needed to develop a plan for joint operations. The commission members 
recognized the diverse plans and strategies of the USIC agencies. Furthermore, 
they knew the leadership challenges in the past would carry forward to the future 
(9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 357). Defining a model joint operation can be 
difficult. Torres (2007) defines unity of effort as, “a process in which different 
organizational powers and authorities come together for unified action in order to 
produce a synergistic effect against a given objective, without any one individual 
or organization being in complete charge of the ways and means.”  More simply, 
he defines it as, “an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve objectives” (Torres, 
2007, pp. 3–4).   
The proposed National Targeting Center (NTC) would alleviate many of 
the concerns against specific and identified terrorists. The issues of terrorism fall 
into both the intelligence and law-enforcement realm. The FBI, which was 
historically a law enforcement agency, has been building its intelligence 
capabilities since 2003 (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 234). The CIA also found itself 
operating in unchartered territory. As a result of the attacks on 9/11, the new war 
on terrorism changed the CIA’s operating landscape. They were providing 
authority to render suspects to other countries for detainment and interrogation 
(Lowenthal, 2006, p. 27). The structure would be designed to assimilate experts 
into a cohesive unit.   
 62 
The NTC would be compromised of all USIC agencies, but each agency 
would not provide an equal amount of resources. As demonstrated in Figure 1, 
the FBI, CIA, and DoD would be the bulk of the resources. These three 
agencies/departments have both the jurisdiction and resources for offensive 
engagement though kinetic strikes, intelligence collection, or judicial action. 
However, other USIC agencies (see Figure 1), such as the National Security 
Agency, provide invaluable resources for intelligence collection.   
 
Figure 1.  Proposed National Targeting Center Resources 
The proposed NTC would be led by a director from the FBI, CIA, or DoD. 
The remaining two agencies would serve in deputy director position. These 
positions would be filled on a rotating basis in two year terms. For example, if the 
director was from the military, then the CIA and FBI would both appoint an 
individual to serve as a deputy director. The purpose of the rotation would be to 
prevent any organization from behaving as the NTC is their unit or losing interest 
because it is not involved in the strategic planning. Leadership is the most 
important factor to attain interagency cooperation. While agencies have a 







across the government spectrum, there must be a person in command, someone 
who is held accountable for and holds others accountable for joint action (Jones, 
2007, p. 12). It should be noted the titles do not matter as much as the leadership 
role each agency would fill. The NTC is not being proposed as a deconfliction 
and assignment entity but rather an operationally focused unit working to 
neutralize terrorists and groups. According to Torres, “Unity of command alone 
will not result in success; the importance of appropriate authorities and power to 
achieve national objectives cannot be over emphasized” (2007, p. 3). While the 
leaders are important, the mission must be accomplished by the investigators, 
officers, and analysts.   
The NTC should be organized according to threats. For example, a 
strategy to counter Hizballah would be different than the strategy to counter Al 
Qaeda. Hizballah has the support of Iran and Syria, and many Arabs in the 
Middle East look favorable upon it for its resistance against Israel. It is also a 
political party in Lebanon (Byman, 2003). The NTC will have multiple teams 
addressing individual threats and groups. Each team should have members from 
each of the three core agencies. For example, the team targeting Al Qaida in 
East Africa (AQEA) would consist of members from the military, the CIA, and the 
FBI. As major subjects are identified by any USIC agency, the NTC would 
determine who it would target. This decision would be accepted by the agencies 
to prevent duplication of effort. Then, the team would develop a plan to mitigate 
the risk posed by the subject. By including the law enforcement, intelligence, and 
military disciplines, the team would be able to formulate the best strategy. Each 
team member would remain part of the execution regardless of the strategy 
chosen. For instance, if the team decided a military capture or kill operation was 
the most effective way to neutralize the threat, the FBI and CIA personnel would 
continue to assist in the pursuit of the subject.   
The NTC would not be a tri-lateral unit. There are many productive and 
active agencies within the USIC doing extraordinary work as part of the 
counterterrorism mission. Personnel from other agencies would form a support 
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element. This element would provide expertise and assistance to the functional 
teams. As visually portrayed in Figure 2, the support element would contribute to 
each of the individual threat teams. If needed, members could be fully assigned 
to a threat team on a temporary basis if there is a specific need. Otherwise, they 
provide intelligence and handle requests for information from the teams.   
 
Figure 2.  National Targeting Center Team Structure 
The NTC would be designed to operate in a collaborative team 
environment. Bringing together a motivated team of subject matter experts 
should increase the USIC’s ability to succeed in the mission. The inclusion of the 
major agencies should reduce the “structural holes” which cause diminishing 
abilities. The NTC would create a significant number of direct ties between 
agencies to increase the collaborative capacity of the unit (Ahuja, 2000, p. 443). 
Improvements in national security must include communication and the flow of 
information. In order to be able to collaborate on joint activities, agencies must 
not be hampered by their own culture, legal issues, or regulations (Jones, 2007, 








leadership would also need to foster a collaborative spirit in the teams. If team 
members lose interest in a target because of the strategic approach being used, 
the value of the collaboration will be greatly reduced. The leaders must reward 
the entire team for successes and ensure all members understand individual 
success is secondary to team success. Also, the teams must be empowered to 
employ resources as needed. The team members should not have to return to 
their respective agencies for authority to conduct actions (Wageman, 1997, pp. 
34–38).   
The authority must rest within the NTC. If structured properly and with 
right personnel, the NTC will become a highly collaborative entity. Collaborative 
capacity is defined as “the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and 
sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes (Thomas et 
al., 2006, p. 2). The mission of the NTC would be a shared mission, and it would 
have the power to execute its mission. There is a relationship between 
organizational support, team processes, and potency. By giving teams the items 
they need to work efficiently, the teams’ processes become more efficient and 
effective. Therefore, their potency increases (Kennedy et al., 2009, p. 89). 
Through strong interagency leadership and a commitment to success, the NTC 
could be a powerful contributor to the counterterrorism mission. 
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It is recommended the United States Intelligence Community create a new 
center similar to the National Targeting Center described above. The mission 
would be to neutralize identified terrorists through any available means. In 2007, 
the DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), Future of Terrorism Task 
Force, authored a report with several key findings: Globalization has benefited 
governments and businesses, but it has also benefited terrorist groups by 
increasing their operational reach.   
Terrorists will alter their future tactics and plans based upon U.S. strategy. 
The Internet will used by terrorists to spread propaganda, recruit and radicalize 
people, and educate possible actors with operational information (Homeland 
Security Advisory Council, 2007, pp. 3–5). Continuing the status quo of joint duty 
assignments and information sharing is a stagnant course of action and lacks 
imagination. The enemy is adapting; therefore, the United States must be willing 
to alter its strategy. During the case study of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ 
attempt to develop better collaboration, one of the articulated problems dealt with 
the organizational structure, specifically “separate information systems, separate 
goals, separate reporting chains and accountability, and separate power bases 
within Congress and the White House” (Linden, 2005, p. 20). The National 
Targeting Center would not solve all of these problems, but it could eliminate 
some and reduce the impact of others. The center would operate on the same 
system and the chain of command would be internal.   
Organizational change is not a simple task. According to Zegart, “Internal 
barriers to organizational change are powerful and deeply entrenched” (2007, p. 
45). Accordingly, the creation of a new unit will be difficult.   It will require strong 
people to champion its strengths as it develops (Caudle, 2006, p. 7). Yet, each 
agency has demonstrated the ability to adapt and change. The CIA has proven 
itself capable of change (May, 2005, p. 10). During the late 1990s, the FBI 
sought to extend its capabilities. They increased the number of Legal Attaché 
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offices overseas to improve relationships with law enforcement partners (Zegart, 
2007, p. 130). The Department of Defense has struggled with true interagency 
collaboration over the last 20 years. However, the DoD’s experiences also 
provide a glimmer of hope as the DoD has created a more cohesive department 
(Reinwald, 2007, p. 13).   
There must also be a consideration for too much change. While executing 
an agenda for change, sometimes the extent of the change is broader than 
originally anticipated (Kelman, 2005, p. 179). The events on 9/11 drastically 
altered the mission of many components of the United States government. For 
the FBI and CIA, counterterrorism became the top priority. The military started 
aggressive and offensive actions to capture or kill terrorist leaders and their 
followers. The many other USIC agencies began to restructure their personnel 
and resources to meet the demands of the USIC. Many people were quick to 
cast blame on the agencies. While not all the criticism was justified, it would hard 
to dismiss the opinions without careful scrutiny. For example one such criticism, 
which was oft repeated, was regarding cooperation. One of the problems that led 
to the attacks on 9/11 was the inability of the CIA, FBI and intelligence 
community to work together cohesively (Zegart, 2007, p. 4). As a result, the USIC 
has placed a greater focus on joint duty programs and information sharing. As 
part of its 500 day plan, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
highlighted its requirement that intelligence community professionals must 
complete a joint duty assignment before they are eligible for promotion to a 
senior executive service position (Office of Director of National Intelligence, 
2008).   
The purpose of this thesis was not to undermine or discount the work of 
the USIC agencies and, more importantly, its people since 9/11. Instead, the 
author commends the USIC for the many plots that it has stopped and the threats 
that have been mitigated. In approximately the first 10 years after 9/11, United 
States law enforcement authorities charged 192 people with terrorism related 
charges (Jenkins, 2012). Since 9/11, there have been 60 terrorist plots in the 
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United States, and four have been successful (Zuckerman, Bucci, & Carafano, 
2013). In a study of terrorism plots from 1999–2009, researchers discovered 22 
percent of the cases were initiated by information developed by a state or local 
department, 30 percent from a federal agency, 29 percent from a public tip, and 
19 percent from intelligence (Strom et al., 2011, p. 14). These numbers highlight 
the need to collaborate in the counterterrorism mission.   
As a whole, the USIC has drastically changed to meet the challenges the 
United States faces from the terrorism threat. According to Amy Zegart (2007), 
here are three aspects of adaptation: “change, the magnitude of change, and 
improved fit.”  These three elements are the measuring stick for whether 
adaptation has occurred (2007, pp. 16–17). The intelligence community has 
changed and changed significantly. The proposed National Targeting Center 
would meet the third aspect of adaptation as it would create a truly, collaborative 
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